



OPERATION RULES
Section C

APPROVED BY EXEMPT RESOLUTION N° 423 OF THE CHILEAN SECURITIES
AND INSURANCE SUPERVISOR DATED DECEMBER 4, 2013

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

SECTION C: CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY SYSTEM

Counterparty System is bound to establish one or more guarantee funds for the purpose of meeting the obligations of the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members, when the guarantees individually deposited or created by them and their principals, if applicable, are insufficient in extraordinary settlement processes. In this respect, there shall be a guarantee fund to settle and clear fixed-income instruments and a guarantee fund to settle and clear derivatives as detailed in paragraphs 1.6.4 and 2.6.5 of this Section, respectively.

1. VARIABLE INCOME CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT

In this chapter, the clearing and settlement of clearing orders originated from transactions in shares, investment funds, mutual funds, subscription options with the normal spot settlement condition, deposited with CCV, traded through the negotiation systems of the stock exchanges authorized by the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor, and the clearing orders originated from purchase and sale transactions in instruments of mutual funds reported by the stock exchanges, as well as the clearing and settlement of dividends, bonus shares or other capital events associated with the clearing orders of the financial instruments mentioned above.

CCLV will provide to the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members the necessary mechanisms to monitor the processes of inflow, on line calculation of net balances and positions, as well as the acceptance, clearing and settlement of their clearing orders in Chilean pesos.

CCLV will only accept and settle clearing orders originated by purchase and sale transactions executed in one of the stock exchanges with which the agreement set forth in point 2, Section A has been undersigned.

1.1. Communication of Clearing Orders

The maximum term to accept terminations or modifications to the accepted orders will be up to one hour before the end of the coverage process for balances and positions provided as long as that it does not affect the normal development of the later stages of the settlement process.

The request of termination or modification of accepted orders occurring after the last acceptance process starts, can be admitted by CCLV only and if it is due to operating errors or faults without the reasonable possibility of being cured and associated with operating errors in the issue or transaction of financial instruments. CCLV may define other exceptional events, situations or errors in order to accept terminations or modifications after the last acceptance process , reporting them through Internal Communications at least 10 business days in advance to their effective date subject prior to the Supervisor's approval.

The specific model of risks for the clearing and settlement of variable income instruments is composed of different financial safeguarding mechanisms designed to properly manage the risks derived from the business' own operation, including the contingency that any Clearing Agent and/or Indirect Clearing Agent of the market might be unable to honor its obligations to the CCLV, the latter being bound to take measures and protect the settlement:

- Amount deriving from the addition of the two highest average net debit balances from the Clearing Members within the last 180 days calculated from the last business day of the month immediately preceding the effective term, for the clearing and settlement of variable income instruments.
- Amount deriving from the addition of the two highest average net debit balances from the Clearing Members within the last 180 days calculated from the last business day of the month immediately preceding the effective term, for the clearing and settlement of variable income instruments.

1.2 Admission of clearing orders

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be empowered in the CCLV system to enter clearing orders, provided they are not suspended.

The mutual cancellation or modification of the clearing orders entered, but still not accepted shall be performed at the request of the stock exchange where the operation was performed, according to the faculties set forth in the corresponding operation manuals concerning the correction and annulment of stock exchange operations.

The way in which said modifications will be made shall be through automatic registration between the respective stock exchanges and the CCLV, modifying the registration of

CCLV systems with the new updated information provided by the stock exchanges themselves.

1.3 Calculation of balances and net positions

The information system perform the net value calculation of the clearing orders entered calculating the net positions by instrument and the financial net balances of each Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in real time.

The net positions calculation is the procedure through which the clearing orders of a certain value entered in to the CCLV systems are multilaterally netted. For the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members the net multilateral value of each security will correspond to the difference in units of securities to be settled from its purchase and its selling operations with all counterparties.

The calculation of net financial balances is the procedure through which the clearing orders entered are multilaterally netted. For the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members the multilateral financial net value corresponds to the difference in chilean pesos between the total to be settled from its purchase and its selling operations with all counterparties.

The clearing orders entered by a Clearing Member may be assigned to another Clearing Members or Indirect Clearing Members which shall confirm these orders. These processes shall be made the same day in which the order entered and until a limit time prior to the operation day closing, which will be communicated through Internal Comms. As long as these clearing orders are confirmed, they shall be included in the calculation of net values of the assigned Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members, subtracting from the net calculations of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members who assigned the orders, provided that the assigned Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members have their respective required guarantees in the event that the assignment takes place after the acceptance of the assigned order. As from the limit time mentioned, the clearing orders assigned and not confirmed shall be kept in the calculation of net values of the Clearing Members through which these orders have originally entered.

1.4 Acceptance of clearing orders

The acceptance corresponds to the process through which the clearing orders entered from the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members become firm and irrevocable.

This process will take place intra-daily and it will be performed immediately after the current guarantees have been calculated.

The list of securities susceptible to be intraday accepted shall be informed through the CCLV systems. However, the clearing orders of the securities on this list that have a significant price variation or if the entered amount to CCLV system exceeds the maximum set amounts for each securities during the operation day, could be accepted in the acceptance process to be held after the end of the trading schedule, between 18:00 and 20:00 hours the same day of entered the order.

The parameters to defining the list of securities and the criteria of variation price and the amount indicated above, shall be reported through Internal Comms at least ten business days before their effective date, prior Board of Directors and the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor approval.

In case of high volatility events or abnormal volumes of clearing orders, meaning high volatility or abnormal volumes as defined in paragraph 2.1 of section C, CCLV shall suspend the intraday acceptance of clearing orders of variable income to a Clearing Member or Indirect Clearing Member or for a particular clearing order, as applicable.

As from the acceptance time of the clearing orders, CCLV irrevocably becomes creditor and debtor of the rights and obligations resulting from the clearing orders accepted by the system.

The procedure for the acceptance of the clearing orders will be as follows:

- The acceptance of clearing orders from the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be based on the level of guarantees required and entered, calculated for the net balances and positions and the risk level of them.
- The system will provide to each Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members Agent updated information about its level of guarantees entered and required, in order to adopt – fast and timely – all measures that allow it to accept all its orders by CCLV systems.
- Its impact at the level of guarantees required and entered and their difference shall be checked for each clearing order entered, this situation shall be permanently monitored.
- In the event CCLV requires from the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members the payment of more guarantees to cover its deficit of guarantees, CCLV will arrange the necessary formalities for them to adjust to the new levels required within the term defined by CCLV, which shall be within the operation day according to that mentioned in item 1.6.
- If the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members do not pay the deficit of guarantees required within the term determined by CCLV, the entered orders on

the intraday acceptance process, shall not be accepted, and them remain as pending of acceptance until the next acceptance process. After the final intraday acceptance process, if the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members have deficit of guarantees the orders which guarantees required are for an amount equivalent to the deficit of guarantees shown in their clearing balances, shall not be accepted and they shall become rejected. Thus, the orders will be taken out of the system and they shall be settled by the parties that took part in the transaction without the participation of CCLV.

- The criteria to define the orders rejected from acceptance shall be sequential as from the last order entered into the system backwards. CCLV may adopt a different criteria for qualified cases informing to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor previously, as long as this measure tends to prevent a large number of clearing orders from being rejected, in which case shall be selected the larger volume orders, to allow adjusting the guarantees required mentioned above with the least impact as possible on the other Clearing Members or Indirect Clearing Members
- CCLV shall apply the penalties defined in these Rules to the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members that due to lack of guarantees have not been able to incorporate their orders into the process of acceptance, being the Clearing Members responsible for the orders from their Indirect Clearing Members. Also, in the case of Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members which acts as stock exchange brokers or direct operators, CCLV may ask for stock exchanges for the suspension of these Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members from their XXXX.
- At the end of the acceptance process, CCLV will communicate through its information systems the net positions and balances that the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members shall pay.

Clearing orders confirmed by the negotiation systems of the stock exchanges where the operation was made according to its internal regulations shall be accepted, in these cases is the respective stock exchange which being responsible for the integrity and truth of said information.

The cancellation or modification of the orders accepted shall be exceptionally made only the day the order is entered and at the request of the stock exchange where the operation was made according to the faculties set forth in their respective operation rules concerning the corrections and annulments of stock exchange operations. The acceptance of these cancellations and modifications shall be informed to the Discipline Committee, which may recommend penalties or fines according to the provisions of these Operations Rules.

The way in which said cancellation or modification shall be made through the automatic registration between the respective stock exchanges and CCLV modifying the registration of CCLV systems with the new updated information provided by the stock exchanges. Notwithstanding the above, CCLV reserves the right to accept these changes to the clearing orders as long as the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members have sufficient guarantees to cover their net positions and balances accepted.

In the event that CCLV rejects the cancellation or modification, the clearing order previously accepted will not experience changes, informing on this fact in writing through electronic mail or letter sent to the General Manager, or the person acting as such, of the applicable stock exchange where the cancellation or modification request was made.

Once the acceptance process has taken place, the net selling and purchasing positions by instrument and the resulting debtor and creditor net balances shall have the character of net positions and balances pending to be settled, which situation shall keep until the applicable settlement date.

1.5 Settlement of balances and positions

The settlement process to extinguish the balances and positions pending to be settled from Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members with CCLV will be performed in order to fulfill the delivery against payment principle.

This principle considers the delivery of cash and securities from the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members with debtors net balances and selling net positions in the fulfillment of their clearing orders, as well as the transfer of said cash and securities from the CCLV to the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members with credit net balances and purchasing net positions, provided that said Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members meet their obligations of payment of their debtor net balances or their selling net positions delivery.

Thus, acting as Central Counterparty, CCLV irrevocably becomes, from the time it accepts the clearing orders, in creditor and debtor of the rights and obligations resulting from said orders according to the provisions of article 12 of Law N° 20,345. For the purposes of removing the risk of principal, CCLV shall not provide the respective securities or cash to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members with positions or balances in default until said defaults have been settled.

1.5.1. Coverage process for balances and positions

From the time the net balances and positions pending to be paid are declared on the day the clearing order is admitted and until a fixed time on the settlement day – which will be communicated through Internal Comms – the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members with debtor net balance shall instruct to the corresponding banks about transferring from their banking accounts - from among those mentioned in Section B - through the Real Time Gross Settlement system, the required funds to the CCLV's cash current account in the Central Bank of Chile, so that these funds may be credited and become available in said account at the time mentioned above at the latest.

Also, the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members with net selling positions shall have the respective instruments or securities available in their custody account kept with Central Securities Depository at the same time as indicated in the preceding point at the latest.

Notwithstanding the above and exclusively for the options of undersigning shares not deposited at Central Securities Depository and which settlement condition at the Stock Exchange sets forth that they should be paid outside the Central Securities Depository, the selling Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall perform a transfer duly authorized to CCLV, to its name, for the multilateral selling net position of said instruments the day prior to settlement. It shall also attach a copy of the respective Physical Settlement Report provided by CCLV through its systems. CCLV will provide a reception voucher for the documents received.

In order to adjust to the hours mentioned, the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall exhaust all possible instances in order to meet their obligations whether by speeding up the settlement processes before third parties, by obtaining loans in cash or in securities, repurchase of securities or use of credit lines as applicable.

Every time a Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members do not pay the total cash corresponding to its net debtor balance during the coverage process, CCLV will immediately report said default to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor and to the stock exchanges.

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members not meeting their obligation to pay the securities and/or cash during the coverage process shall be the object of the disciplinary measures as set in the Section of Penalties and Fines of this Operations Rules.

1.5.2 Process to complement non covered balances and positions

If after the end of the coverage process any Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shows uncovered net selling positions, CCLV will immediately activate the

system of securities loans as defined in this Rule, including the requirement of loan in favor of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default, in order to complete the position in default before the start of the checking process of balances and positions.

The time at which the complementation process will start and end shall be set through Internal Comms and it may not be less than 60 minutes. Without prejudice to the above, this process may take less, provided that balances and positions in default are totally paid.

Also, if after the end of the coverage process there are balances in default by one or more of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members, CCLV will immediately make use of the excess guarantees of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default, considering the cash entered or through selling operations with repurchase commitment with the applicable securities.

If balances in default remain, CCLV shall instruct the applicable banks for the transfer of funds corresponding to the payment from its banking current accounts kept with financial institutions to its banking current account in cash kept with the Central Bank of Chile in order to complete the missing balances and perform the financial settlement up to the amount required by these Operations Rules for its credit lines.

Once the complementation process has ended, the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members not paying the securities and/or cash, shall pay them in full to CCLV as soon as possible within the settlement day, so that CCLV may return the loans and/or be reimbursed of the financial resources provided used to cover the balances or positions in default.

Notwithstanding the above and in order to back-up and guarantee the mechanisms described in this point and used to cover the defaults of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members that shows balances and/or positions in default, CCLV shall retain totally or partially as deemed convenient by it, the purchasing positions in the case of a balance in default and/or position in default and it shall suspend the transfer of cash corresponding to the credit balances of the applicable Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in the event of having a position in default.

Values being withheld shall be deposited in CCLV's custody account at the Central Securities Depository. Balances in cash referred to shall be transferred from the CCLV's current account in cash at the Central Bank of Chile in the context of corresponding settlement of balances, only once the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members meet the corresponding obligations in default. CCLV shall not authorize withdrawing the entered guarantees by the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default while balances and/or positions in default remain.

Under this circumstance, CCLV shall be considered especially empowered and instructed by the corresponding Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members to proceed as

already described, which circumstance shall be expressly recorded in the adhesion contract undersigned by the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members indicated.

In the event that balances and/or positions in default covered by CCLV, and have not been paid by the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default, CCLV will sell the positions and dispose of the guarantees withheld and the guarantee fund according to the procedures described in the extraordinary settlement process in order to cover the balances and/or positions contributed by CCLV. If the guarantee fund is used, first shall be covered the balances and/or positions of the affected Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members and then those belonging to CCLV.

Costs incurred in obtaining the loan of securities, selling operations with repurchase commitment and/or use of resources and credit lines by CCLV shall be chargeable to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default.

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members generating a balance and/or position in default shall be the object of the disciplinary measures set forth in the Section of Penalties and Fines of these Rules, which situation shall be reported to the Discipline Committee.

1.5.3 Process to check balances and positions

At the end of the complementation process and prior to the start of settlement process mentioned in the number below, CCLV shall check the balances and positions which cash and instruments are available in the banking current account in cash kept by CCLV at the Central Bank of Chile and at the Central Securities Depository's withholding accounts. The schedule at which this process shall start and end will be set through Internal Comms.

The purchasing positions or credit balances being affected by the net selling positions which instruments are not in the Central Securities Depository's withholding accounts or by those balances which cash is not available at the banking current account in cash kept by CCLV in the Central Bank of Chile and after CCLV has performed the formalities indicated in the item 1.5.2 above shall pass to the settlement extraordinary process described in this Rules.

The procedure to select the purchasing positions or credit balances being affected by the non-fulfillment shall be performed under the criterion of affecting the fewest number of counterparties as possible by prioritizing the selection of Clearing Members over the Indirect Clearing Members, the time when the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members made the covered the balances and positions and the origin of positions or balances in default, following this priority order.

CCLV shall withhold totally or partially as it considers appropriate, the purchasing positions in the case of a balance and/or position in default, and it shall suspend the transfer of cash

corresponding to the credit balances of the respective Clearing Members who showing a position in default. The values withheld shall be deposited in the custody account kept by CCLV in the Central Securities Depository and the referred cash balances, in the banking current account in cash kept by CCLV in the Central Bank of Chile. CCLV shall not allow the removal of entered guarantees by the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default.

In the event a Clearing Members becomes in default, the Indirect Clearing Members operating through the former shall not be affected by the actions described above if they have met their obligations.

In the event where Indirect Clearing Members becomes in default, CCLV shall withhold totally or partially as it considers appropriate, the purchasing positions in the case of a balance and/or position in default, and it shall suspend the transfer of cash corresponding to the credit balances of the respective Indirect Clearing Members who showing a position in default, and, if necessary, of the Clearing Member or Clearing Members through which the orders have been entered, in proportion to the amount in default. The securities withheld shall be deposited in the custody account kept by CCLV in the Central Securities Depository and the referred cash balances, in the banking current account in cash kept by CCLV in the Central Bank of Chile. CCLV shall not allow the removal of entered guarantees by the Clearing Member or its Clearing Members.

All of the above intends to support the obtainment of loans of securities, selling operations with repurchase commitment, as well as contributing the necessary resources to cover the obligations resulting during and at the end of the extraordinary settlement process.

The result of the calculation and procedures for the withholding of securities and the suspension of the transfer of cash shall be immediately communicated to the affected parties through direct communication to the General Manager or to the person acting as such, indicating the reasons for such a measure, as well as the amount and background information of the Indirect Clearing Members in default if is necessary.

The detail of balances or positions in default shall be reported through CCLV systems of information.

1.5.4 Settlement balances and positions Process (settlement schedule)

At the end of the checking process, CCLV shall perform the settlement process where balances and positions will be simultaneously settled under the procedure described below. The hours in which this process will take place shall be established through Internal Comms.

Settlement of balances:

- Transfer of funds – under the instructions for payment provided to the RTGS System – from the banking current account in cash kept by CCLV in the Central Bank of Chile to the participants of said system of payments where the Clearing

Members / Indirect Clearing Members keep their corresponding banking current accounts with net credit balance. These transfers of funds will be made subject to the rules and instructions given by the Central Bank of Chile for this kind of operations.

Settlement of positions:

- Transfer of securities – under instructions for the Central Securities Depository Systems – from the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members depositor account with net selling positions to the depositor account for settlement purposes kept by CCLV in the Central Securities Depository, and from said account to the account of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members with net purchasing positions.
- For the options of undersigning shares not deposited in Central Securities Depository and which settlement condition at the Stock Exchange specifies that they are settled outside the Central Securities Depository, CCLV – at the time of settlement – shall provide the purchasing Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members a transfer duly authorized for the net purchasing position of said instruments.

By checking the execution of the prior processes in the systems managed by the Central Bank of Chile and Central Securities Depository respectively, the settlement process shall be considered ended.

The detail of balances and positions settled shall be reported through CCLV systems of information.

Without prejudice to the schedules set forth through Internal Comms according to that mentioned in this point, CCLV may settle in advance the balances and positions pending to be settled, under the condition that the fulfillment of all Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members is verified as regards the payment of their net debtor balances and the total coverage of their net selling positions, in which case the closing hour shall be subject to the fulfillment of these conditions.

1.5.5 Extraordinary Settlement Process

The purpose of the extraordinary settlement process is to arrange and settle the balances and/or positions being affected by defaults according to that set forth in these Rules.

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members with balances and/or positions in default, shall perform all necessary formalities to pay to CCLV the missing cash or securities and to pay their defaults. Once said defaults have been paid, CCLV shall release the cash and positions withheld, as applicable, from the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default.

The extraordinary term to settled said defaults may not exceed 12:00 hours of next settlement business day in case of defaults for lack of cash, and four settlement business days after the original settlement date in case of lack of securities.

CCLV shall continue incorporating the balances and positions in default automatically to the next calculation processes for current guarantees during the whole period of default.

In the event of using the guarantees of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in the procedure of extraordinary settlement, the entered guarantees by the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in Default shall be used to clear and pay the variable income securities under the settlement condition T+2, and the entered guarantees in excess by the corresponding Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in the other CCLV's clearing and settlement systems, in that order.

Without prejudice to the above, in special cases of risks for the process of clearing and settlement entrusted to the central counterparty system, i.e., extraordinary events affecting a high number of counterparties or involving significant amounts in default, insufficiency of guarantees, default on payments from one or more Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members, non-operation or access to the RTGS system of the Central Bank of Chile, non-operation or access to the securities transfer systems of the Central Securities Depository, suspensions of the market and of the financial system or other events of similar nature, CCLV may exceptionally decide other contingent mechanisms of settlement, informing this duly in advance to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor and the Central Bank of Chile the same day the fact takes places; this procedure does not require authorization or pronouncement for execution, considering anyway the applicable rules as to the RTGS Systems and the contingent mechanisms provided thereby.

1.5.5.1 In case of lack of cash

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default for lack of cash shall perform all necessary arrangements to pay the total balances in default, instructing the applicable banks to perform the corresponding payments to the banking current account kept by CCLV in the Central Bank of Chile, giving the applicable instructions for the transfer of funds (ITF). Should the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default provide said missing cash to CCLV before 12:00 hours of next business day after the settlement day, CCLV shall immediately instruct the applicable ITFs chargeable to its banking current account in cash and considering the banks or institutions where the affected Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members keep their current accounts as the beneficiary thereof, executing the transfer of cash required subject to the operation hours of RGTS System, and terminating the related obligations. The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default shall anyway be responsible for the payment corresponding to the cost of using CCLV's own resources or third parties'.

Parallel to this and in order to obtain the cash required to settle the balances in default and the obligations with CCLV at 12:00 of the next business day after the settlement date at the latest, CCLV shall arrange loans of cash and selling operations with repurchase commitment. To this effect, the securities withheld or guarantees paid from the corresponding Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be pledged in favor of the financial institutions that give said loans or sold in selling operations with repurchase commitment, first using the instruments issued by the Central Bank of Chile and the General Treasury of the Republic.

CCLV may also sell the values withheld and/or the entered guarantees from the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members or both of them, as applicable, so that to obtain the cash required to settle the balances in default and the obligations with CCLV, in that order.

This selling shall be performed by giving instructions to one or more brokers, so that to be executed as soon as possible through the stock market for the amount necessary to cover the missing cash balance and penalties for default. Balances in default shall be settled immediately once the moneys from such a sale are received according to the settlement conditions of the stock exchange operations.

If the necessary funds to cover the balance of missing cash and penalties for default are not collected, the properties included in the guarantee fund shall be used for the missing amount according to the procedure mentioned in number 2 of this Section.

In addition, if there is still a deficit after the actions taken according to the procedure mentioned above, CCLV shall use the properties included in the reserve fund according to that mentioned in number 2 of this Section and then its heritage to pay the affected Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members.

Once the necessary funds are collected to settle the obligations in default, CCLV shall immediately instruct the applicable ITFs chargeable to its banking current account in cash

and considering the bank or banks where the affected Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members keep their current accounts as the beneficiary thereof, executing the transfer of cash required subject to the operation hours of RGTS System, and terminating the related obligations.

When CCLV's own resources have been used to pay in cash balances in default, it shall transfer – in addition to the penalty applied for this kind of situations – the costs incurred in to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default as defined by the CCLV and reported to such Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members on a regular basis.

All of the above without prejudice to the judicial and/or extrajudicial actions against the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members may be started by the CCLV, which shall not be an obstacle to pay the balances in default at 12:00 hours of the next business day after the original settlement date at the latest.

Without prejudice to the above, if at the end of the settlement day, the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members has not met their cash balances with the CCLV, the latter shall request to the stock exchanges the suspension in the negotiation systems that same day, when said Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members have the capacity of direct broker and the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be operationally suspended, being not able to enter their clearing orders, which situation shall be reported to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor and to the Discipline Committee. The operational suspension will be kept until the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members regularizes the reasons that caused that suspension.

This process shall be conducted through Direct Comms on the default day sent to the General Manager or to the person acting as such, of the applicable stock exchange through which the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members operates in which they detail the reason for the request and a copy of that request shall be sent to the General Manager of the party in default and of the Clearing Members involved that same day, in the event that the party in default is an Indirect Clearing Members, and to the agencies mentioned above.

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members suspended shall remain responsible for the settlement of balances and positions pending to be settled and for the balances and positions in default corresponding to the clearing orders accepted by CCLV prior to the time of suspension. Also, the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members suspended shall remain bound to meet the other obligations set forth by these Rules.

1.5.5.2 In case of lack of securities

Should a position be in default for lack of securities on the settlement day, CCLV shall continue arranging a loan of securities in favor of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing

Members in default until 12:00 hours of the next business day, so that to obtain the missing securities and settle the applicable balance.

As from 12:00 hours of the business day after the settlement, CCLV will activate the repurchase mechanism of securities to the name of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members being in delay to be delivered to the purchasing party, without prejudice to continue trying to obtain the loan of securities mentioned above. For the process of securities repurchase, CCLV will provide a purchase order to a stock exchange broker to be executed at the stock exchange to CCLV name.

Therefore, from the time mentioned in the preceding paragraph and during the extraordinary settlement process– that can extend until the closing time of the stock market on the fourth business day after the original settlement day – there shall be the following options to settle the default:

- i) Continue making arrangements for the loan of securities in favor of the participant being delayed.
- ii) Repurchase the securities to the name of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members being in delayed for delivery; or
- iii) Activate the settlement mechanism through financial compensation once the repurchase attempt has been unsuccessfully made for a period of at least 60 minutes as from 12:00 hours of the next business day after the original settlement date.

CCLV may combine the implementation of one or more options already mentioned to extraordinarily settle the positions in default, thus meeting the requirements mentioned above.

Notwithstanding the above, on the original settlement day, CCLV may combine the implementation of one or more options mentioned above to extraordinarily settle the position in default in the event the affected party has asked for this procedure to be applied, which shall be reported in writing, whether through a letter or electronic mail, to the General Manager or to the person acting as such at CCLV, stating the reason for such request. The aforementioned extraordinary settlement may be made only within the hour prior to the closing of the RTGP managed by the Central Bank.

CCLV shall determine the amount to be paid as financial compensation that shall correspond to the result between the number of instruments involved in the fulfillment and the differential between the settlement price and the average weighed selling price of the instrument of the position in default, provided that this result is positive. On the contrary, no compensation shall be paid.

For the afore mentioned calculation, the settlement price shall be determined by the Committee of Risks, so that it may be a representative market price, considering the term of the payment, the historic behavior, volatility, liquidity and other relevant variables of the

instrument. In addition, the selling average weighed price of the instrument of the position in default shall be reported by the CCLV.

In the extraordinary period of settlement for lack of securities, the CCLV may use the non-transferred balances and/or sell the securities withheld, as well as the guarantees paid of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default as applicable, in order to fund the options used to settle the default of securities and the obligations with the CCLV.

The selling of securities withheld and instruments paid in guarantee shall take place by providing instructions to one or more brokers, so that to be executed as soon as possible through the stock market up to the amount necessary to cover the loan of securities, the repurchase of securities, the financial compensation, the obligations with the CCLV, and the penalties for default, as applicable.

If the amounts obtained according to that mentioned above plus the non-transferred cash to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default are not enough to settle the positions in default, the obligations with the CCLV and the penalties for cases of default, the securities included in the guarantee fund for the missing amount shall be sold according to the procedure described in number 3 hereof.

If there is still a deficit after the actions under the afore mentioned procedure have been taken, CCLV shall make use of the assets included in the reserve fund, selling the securities making it up as set forth in number 3 of this Section and then its assets to pay the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members affected.

Once the necessary instruments are collected to pay the positions in default and the obligations with CCLV, the latter shall immediately make the applicable transfer at Central Securities Depository from CCLV custody account to the custody account of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members affected, subject to the operation hours of Central Securities Depository System, and terminating the related obligations.

In the event of settlement by financial compensation, once the necessary funds are collected to pay the obligations in default, CCLV shall immediately instruct the applicable ITFs chargeable to its banking current account in cash and considering the banks or institutions where the affected Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members keep their current accounts as the beneficiary thereof, executing the transfer of cash required subject to the operation hours of RGTS System, and terminating the related obligations.

In the event a position in default is settled through financial compensation, the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members entitled to receive securities, shall be bound to receive the cash within the terms reported by CCLV to this effect.

Under the settlement by financial compensation, the obligations for the positions in default shall be considered terminated both for the purchasing and selling Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members.

All of the above without prejudice to the judicial and/or extrajudicial actions against the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default that may be started by the CCLV, which shall not be an obstacle to settle the order on the fourth business day after the original settlement date.

If the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members do not meet their delivery of securities, the financial compensation and the obligations with CCLV during the extraordinary period of settlement, CCLV shall request the stock exchanges for suspension in the negotiation systems that same day, when said Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members have the capacity of direct broker and said Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be operationally suspended, being not able to enter their clearing orders, reporting to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor and to the Discipline Committee on the same day of occurrence . The operational suspension will be kept until the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members regularizes the reasons that caused that suspension.

This process shall be conducted through direct communication – stating the reasons for the request - on the default day sent to the General Manager or to the person acting as such, of the applicable stock exchange through which the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members operates and a copy of that request shall be sent to the General Manager of the party in default and of the Clearing Members involved that same day, in the event that the party in default is an Indirect Clearing Members, and to the agencies mentioned above.

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members being suspended shall remain responsible for the settlement of balances and positions pending to be settled and for the balances and positions in default corresponding to the clearing orders accepted by CCLV prior to the time of suspension. Also, the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members suspended shall remain bound to meet the other obligations set forth by these Rules.

1.6 Financial Safeguards

1.6.1 General Provisions

CCLV has a system of risks able to properly manage the risks caused by the business own operation, including the contingency where any Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members, of the market is not able to honor its obligations with the CCLV, forcing them to take measures in order to safeguard the settlement, both in time and form, through extraordinary procedures, both in time and form, through extraordinary procedures.

The mechanisms of financial safeguards adopted by the CCLV include demanding from the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members requirements of solvency and liquidity, as set forth in Section B of these Rules, the request of the guarantees demanded,

which are calculated by considering the minimum guarantees, the current guarantees and the additional guarantees as indicated in 1.6.3.2, 1.6.3.2 and 1.6.3.4 below, and the contributions to the guarantee fund referred to in number 2 of this Section, as applicable. These demands for guarantees, along with the reserve fund, established by the company according to that mentioned in number 2 of this Section, the use of credit lines by CCLV as indicated in number 1.6.2 and CCLV's own assets are intended to cover the risks that may arise from the settlement of the clearing orders from the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members according to that mentioned in these Rules.

In the event of a default in the settlement of balances and positions resulting from the orders accepted, CCLV shall not transfer the balances and shall keep the positions of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in default, using them along with the safeguards mentioned above, so that to ensure the fulfillment of the payment of said balances and positions.

In this respect the financial safeguards defined below shall operate according to the following:

1.6.2 CCLV Credit Lines

In those cases where CCLV acts a Central Counterparty of the orders accepted and due to the impossibility of accessing to cash by the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in order to timely meet its financial obligations with the CCLV, the latter will resort to drafts from its credit lines obtained in banks and it shall instruct them to make the applicable transfer of funds through the RTGS System to the banking current account in cash kept with the Central Bank of Chile, so that to complete the missing balances and settle the clearing orders during the settlement hours.

Due to the above, CCLV will keep contracts for credit lines with at least two banks for a minimum amount available equal to or greater than the addition of the two biggest average net debt balances of the Clearing Members within the last 180 days calculated for the last business day of the month prior to its term.

The banks where CCLV obtains credit lines shall be entities established in Chile reporting a capital adjustment index not below 10% for its assets weighed according to risk and which time deposits below a year are rated at Level 1 or above by at least two risk rating agencies from those registered in the registry of assessing companies under the charge of the Chilean Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions. They shall also participate in the RTGS System.

1.6.3 Individual Guarantee

1.6.3.1 Guarantee Demanded

The guarantee demanded to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members will correspond to the higher value between the minimum guarantee calculated and the current guarantee, plus the additional guarantee requested.

The guarantee demanded at the beginning of each operation day shall be entered until a limit hour to be set through Internal Comms. To this effect the following shall be considered:

- The minimum guarantee shall be reported by CCLV on the last business day of each month to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members and it shall keep in effect during the next calendar month.
- The amount of the current guarantee reported at the closing of the previous operation day shall be used for the calculation of the guarantee demanded to be entered at the beginning of each operation day.
- The additional guarantees will correspond to those required on the previous operation day and that requirement shall keep in effect as provided for by CCLV.

CCLV shall calculate and report every hour during the operation day the level of current guarantee to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members as indicated in these Rules. The schedules of guaranties calculation will be reported through Internal Comms at least ten business days before their entry into force.

If from the intra-daily analysis of the guarantees required they result in being 30% higher than the entered guarantees or above UF 20,000, CCLV shall make a margin call for this differential at any time during the operation day, which shall be paid within the period required by the CCLV that may not exceed the starting of the calculation process of subsequent guarantees made on the operation day. In the event where CCLV make a margin call in the penultimate and final calculate of intraday guarantees, it shall be entered at the required schedule by CCLV.

Without prejudice to the above, the CCLV may make a margin call at any time of the day for percentages or amounts lower than those mentioned, as applicable. In this case, the term given by the CCLV to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members to pay the margin call shall depend on the risk level thereof, on the percentage of guarantees required as to the entered guarantees, on the concentration of positions of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members , the nature of the instruments involved in the positions, the amount of the margin call and other criteria considered relevant at the moment, but they may not exceed the hours of this system's operation day.

In addition, the CCLV may require additional guarantees from a Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members at any time during the operation day. The term provided by the

CCLV to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members to pay these additional guarantees shall depend on the risk level thereof and on the percentage of guarantees demanded in relation to the entered guarantees, but they may not exceed the hours set to pay the guarantee demanded at the beginning of each operation day corresponding to the next business day after which the requirement was made.

The CCLV's system of information shall provide each Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members with updated information about its levels of entered and required guarantees during the hours of the operation day. It shall also provide the Clearing Members with information about the level of required and entered guarantees of its Indirect Clearing Members.

Should the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members not pay the guarantee required, whether at the beginning of the day or during the same under the term required by the CCLV, clearing orders incorporated to that calculation shall not be accepted, which requirement of associated guarantees is for an amount equal to the deficit of guarantees presented, the latter being in the condition of rejected.

If during the hours defined by the CCLV for the payment of the guarantee demanded – whether at the beginning of the day or during the same – the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members do not meet the obligations, the CCLV shall immediately ask the stock exchanges for the suspensions of the negotiation systems when they have the capacity of broker or direct operator, and the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be operationally suspended from all clearing and settlement systems managed by the CCLV, reporting to the Discipline Committee and the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor the same day of occurrence. The operational suspension shall keep until the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members regularizes the reasons that caused said suspension.

This process shall be conducted through Direct Comms – specifying the reasons for such request - on the default day sent to the General Manager or to the person acting as such, of the applicable stock exchange through which the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members operates and a copy of that request shall be sent to the General Manager of the party in default and of the Clearing Members involved that same day, in the event that the party in default is an Indirect Clearing Members, and to the agencies mentioned above.

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members being suspended shall remain responsible for the settlement of balances and positions pending to be settled and for the balances and positions in default corresponding to the clearing orders accepted by CCLV prior to the time of suspension. Also, the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members suspended shall remain bound to meet the other obligations set forth by these Rules.

The Clearing Members shall be responsible for contributing the guarantees demanded and resulting from the orders of their Indirect Clearing Members that were entered through it, when the latter do not meet said requirements according to the provisions of this number.

The types of instruments or securities authorized to pay guarantees and their valuation methodology shall be governed by that mentioned in Section E of these Rules.

1.6.3.2 Minimum Guarantee

This guarantee shall correspond to the minimum level of guarantee that the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members, if appropriate, shall permanently keep with CCLV, which amount is calculated on the basis of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members's historic net positions accepted at CCLV.

The calculation of this guarantee amount shall be equal to the average current guarantee demanded at the beginning of each operation day within the last 90 calendar days, including in that average only the days with operations.

For the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members the calculation of the minimum guarantee is made on the basis of its consolidated net positions accepted for the clearing and settlement of variable income under settlement condition T+2.

In the case of a Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members recently accepted, minimum guarantees shall be required from them to start operating calculated on the basis of the average minimum guarantees of the other participants.

Until the third month of operation of a new Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members, the amount of minimum guarantees to be entered will correspond to the greater value between the amount mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the minimum guarantees calculated on the basis of the average current guarantees accrued.

1.6.3.3 Current Guarantee

The current guarantee corresponds to those destined to cover at least the losses resulting from the replacement risk that could materialize in the event of possible default of the obligations of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members under normal conditions of market's volatility.

For the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members, the calculation of the current guarantee is made on the basis of the clearing orders originated by variable income operations under settlement condition T+2.

The methodology used by CCLV to define the calculation of the current guarantee and the types of instruments authorized to pay them and its form of valuation described in Section E of these Rules, shall be at any time subject to the regulations provided by the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor.

The methodology to calculate the value of the current guarantee applied on a daily and intra-daily basis intends to measure the settlement risk resulting from the clearing orders of the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members applying the Value at Risk (VaR) methodology by historic simulation, described in Annex I of this Section. This allows to measuring the potential loss of orders of each Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members under normal conditions of the market within a certain interval of time with a certain level of confidence, considering the market's price movements. The purpose of measuring the risk under historic simulation is to verify the possible losses and gains according to the market movements of the last mobile year. This risk is equal to the value of the current guarantee required.

The confidence level to be used for the calculation is of 99%, i.e., it considers that the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members will deposit guarantees to cover losses for market volatility for 99% of days considering the last 250 business days.

The calculation of the current guarantee shall be made every 60 minutes, including the clearing orders entering the CCLV's systems by the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members and its balances and positions pending to be settled and in default, so that to permanently measure and monitor the possible requirements of margin calls to the CCLV's Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members

Also, the calculation mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be made more frequently during period of greater volatility and abnormal volumes. Greater volatility means that range of fluctuations of risk factor prices with an occurrence probability below 1% during one day of transactions and taking as basis for said calculation - at least - the last 250 business days. Also, abnormal volumes shall mean those net positions that exceed the third greatest net daily position recorded during - at least - the last 250 business days.

The business days to be used in the methodology to define the calculation of the current guarantee under normal conditions of market's volatility and during period of greater volatility and abnormal volumes, shall be reported through Internal Comms at least ten business days before their effective date, prior Board of Directors approval.

CCLV may exclude from the calculation of current guarantees, those events or specific operations of significant amounts that alter the normal calculation of said guarantees, such as public bids for the purchase of shares, auctions and primary placements, reporting to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor on the same day of occurrence.

Should a Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members choose to deposit the instruments to be sold in advance into the coverage account especially provided by CCLV at Central Securities Depository to this effect, the obligation of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members in this instrument shall be considered covered and consequently the CCLV will deduct from the calculation of the current guarantee of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members the guarantees exclusively associated with these clearing orders.

The calculation methodology for the current guarantees shall be assessed on a quarterly basis in relation to the sufficiency of the guarantees as regards the hypothetical past defaults through retrospective tests.

1.6.3.4 Additional Guarantee

If under the financial information analysis of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members 's, the CCLV determines a higher exposure to risk than that resulting from its level of operations with respect to its level of capital it shall be empowered to require additional guarantees.

CCLV may determine additional guarantees according to the relation between the level of capital, its level of operations, the operation capacity of the Clearing Members or the Indirect Clearing Members and other criteria considered relevant at the time. This requirement shall keep in effect until CCLV considers that those variables and criteria have been successfully.

1.6.4 Variable Income Guarantee Fund

The variable income guarantee fund shall be at least equal to the sum of the two largest potential losses not covered by the required current individual guarantees required, considering extreme market conditions with a reasonable probability of occurrence, such calculation being based on at least the last 250 business days.

High volatility shall mean the fluctuation range of prices of the risk factors with an occurrence probability below 1% during one day of transaction. Also, abnormal volumes shall refer to those net positions with an occurrence probability below 1% during one day of transaction. At least the last 250 business days will be taken as calculation basis, and they will be reported through Internal Communications at least 10 business days in advance to its effective term, subject to prior Board of Directors' approval.

In addition, compared to high volatility events in the market or abnormal volumes of clearing orders, CCLV –with the prior favorable proposal of the Risk Committee, may exclude from the calculation of the fund the results of the stress tests on such events, to the extent that such results exceed by far the scenario with a reasonable probability of occurrence, all of which shall be recorded in the relevant minutes of the meeting of the Risk Committee. Anyway, the approval of the exclusion situations mentioned above shall be also previously approved by the Supervisor. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it shall be understood that the exclusion situations associated with high volatility events in the market or abnormal volumes of clearing orders, as included in the preceding paragraph, have already been previously approved by the Supervisor.

- i) Considering a horizon of at least the last 250 business days, Clearing Members: the value of the worst possible loss of its net balances and positions resulting at the end of the trading day for the clearing and settlement of equity instruments under the normal spot settlement condition, using the crisis scenarios set through Internal Communications, is calculated for each Clearing Agent and its Indirect Clearing Members.
- ii) For each Clearing Agent, the value of required guarantees is deducted, from the worst loss calculated in the preceding point i), considering those required both from the Clearing Members and its Indirect Clearing Members as defined in number 1.6.3.1 of this Section, Clearing Members.

1.6.4 Reserve Fund

As defined in number 2 of this Section.

2. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT OF DERIVATIVES

This chapter regulates the clearing and settlement of clearing orders for derivatives, which are issued by Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members in their own names, and on behalf of their principals, originated from futures and forwards transactions and being settled the trading day immediately following the calculation day of their financial balances.

The futures contracts likely to be cleared and settled in CCLV may refer to one or more of the following underlying assets:

- i) Indices of shares, fixed-income and money market instruments.
- ii) Interest rates or interest rates indexes (nominal in pesos, UF, US dollar).
- iii) Foreign currencies according to N° 2 of Chapter III.D.1 of the Compendium of Financial Regulations, Chile Central Bank.
- iv) Consumer Price Index (CPI).
- v) Unidad de Fomento (UF) (Indexation Unit)
- vi) Fixed-Income Instruments issued by the Chile Central Bank and the General Treasury of the Republic of Chile
- vii) Shares and Investment Fund Shares.

Futures contracts shall at least indicate their underlying assets, future price, round lot, effective and expiry dates of the contract and financial settlement modality expressed and payable in local currency.

In addition, the forwards contracts likely to be cleared and settled in CCLV shall refer to the same underlying assets contemplated for the futures contracts, be issued in financial settlement terms, be denominated and payable in local currency, and have at least the following characteristics:

- i) Underlying asset
- ii) Amount
- iii) Forward price
- iv) Effective and expiry date of the contract

The CCLV will set specific standardization characteristics in addition to those already mentioned that shall be complied with by the forwards contracts to be cleared and settled in CCLV, which shall be informed through an Internal Comm at least 10 business days in advance to their effective date subject to the prior approval of the Supervisor and through the CCLV Web site.

CCLV will accept and clear the clearing orders resulting from purchase and sale transactions of derivatives on any of the stock exchanges authorized by the Supervisor with which the agreement set in point 2, Section A has been entered into, or carried out

over-the-counter. In the latter case, they are to be directly communicated by the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members or by the one empowered by them.

CCLV will provide the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members with the necessary mechanisms for them to on-line monitor the processes of admission, calculation of balances, calculation of open net contracts, assignment, limits, and the clearing and settlement of their clearing orders of derivatives. CCLV will also provide the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members with information as to the admission, calculation of balances, calculation of open net contracts, assignment, limits, and guarantees of the principals.

Moreover, CCLV will also keep record of the transactions of derivatives accepted for clearing and settlement in the Central Counterparty System according to the terms and characteristics defined in number 4, Section C of these Rules, hereinafter the Registry of CCLV Derivatives Transactions. Access to said registry will be possible through a web site arranged by CCLV to provide relevant information to the public on derivatives transactions accepted in the Central Counterparty System, hereinafter the Web site CCLV/Derivatives.

2.1 Communication of Clearing Orders for Derivatives

For the communication of clearing orders of derivatives carried out in one of the stock exchanges authorized by the Supervisor, CCLV will agree with such exchanges the delivery and receipt of information on the clearing orders on an on-going basis, which must occur immediately after trading has been agreed.

For those clearing orders arising from derivatives transactions carried out over-the-counter as authorized by the Supervisor and directly communicated by the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members or by the person empowered by them, such communication shall take place the same day when the transaction is confirmed by the involved parties and within the hours to be reported by the CCLV through an Internal Comm, at least 10 business days in advance to their effective term.

The stock exchanges or the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members from which the derivatives clearing orders come, shall be responsible for the completeness and truthfulness of the information received by the CCLV.

Each clearing order shall at least contain the following information:

- Trading date and time
- Maturity date
- Type of derivatives
- Underlying asset
- Mnemonics
- Round lot

- Amount
- Price or rate
- Quantity
- Purchasing broker
- Selling broker
- Purchasing Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent
- Selling Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent
- Transaction page on the exchange
- Stock exchange or broker

2.2 Admission and Registration of Derivatives Clearing Orders

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be empowered in the CCLV system to enter clearing orders, provided they are not suspended.

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members entering clearing orders to the system shall assign those orders on their own account or on the account of their principals.

In order to allocate clearing orders, the CCLV shall previously register the principals in the system. To this effect, the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent shall send the CCLV a copy of the contract in effect, entered into with each principal in order to subscribe derivatives contracts containing at least the following principal's data or particulars:

- TIN (RUT)
- Name or firm name
- Economic sector
- Country
- Capacity of the person related to the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent

The specific procedure for a Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent to report to the CCLV and their principals shall be set by an Internal Comm at least 10 days before its effective date.

The CCLV will automatically register in the system all clearing orders entered and coming from stock exchanges, which shall be registered in the name of each Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent and allocated to each principal, or to their own account, as instructed by the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent.

Clearing orders arising from derivatives transactions carried out over-the-counter shall be previously confirmed by the involved Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members and shall be subsequently automatically registered in the CCLV system. The specific procedure to check the confirmation of said orders, if applicable, shall be established by an Internal Comm at least 10 business days prior to its effective date.

The cancellation or modification of the clearing orders originated from transactions with derivatives carried out over-the-counter authorized by the Supervisor, which have been entered, but are still not accepted, will be performed at the request of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members involved in the transaction. Such modifications shall be made through automatic registration in the CCLV, modifying the registration of CCLV systems with the new updated information provided by the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members.

2.3 Calculation of Net Balances and Open Contracts

The information system, in line with registration, will calculate net values of the clearing orders for derivatives resulting from stock exchange transactions and carried out over-the-counter as authorized by the Supervisor, calculating in real time the net open contracts by derivative and their series, and the net balances for each Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent and their principals.

Clearing orders shall be allocated by a Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent on their own account or on the account of a principal, in the same day the order is admitted and up to a time limit set by an Internal Comm, at least 10 business days in advance to its effective date. To the extent that such clearing orders are allocated, they will be included in the calculation of open net contracts by derivative and its series, and in the calculation of net balances of its own account or in the account of the allocated principal, , as applicable.

The Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent may modify the allocation of a clearing order within the previously mentioned time schedule. Should a Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent modify an allocation made to its own account, it shall be subject to the disciplinary measures set forth in the Section of Penalties and Fines hereof.

From previously mentioned the time limit , the clearing orders not allocated will be incorporated in the calculation of open net contracts of the own account of the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent through which said orders were originally entered, and thus all orders shall be allocated.

The calculation of net open contracts of the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent, on its account and on the principal's account, corresponds to the procedure through which the purchase and sale open contracts are netted according to their allocations, for a derivative and its series in the CCLV system.

The calculation of the net balance for the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent corresponds to the sum of net balances of its own account and of the net balances of each principal.

The calculation of the net balance of its own account and the principal's is the procedure through which the rights and obligations in cash obtained from the calculation and valuation of the corresponding open contracts, are obtained, considering the gains or losses during the term and those generated on the maturity day for clearing orders of derivatives originated from stock exchange transactions and the gains or losses generated on the maturity date of the clearing orders of derivatives carried out over-the-counter, authorized by the Supervisor. In addition, any gain or loss generated by closing open contracts will be considered in the corresponding calculation of net balances.

For those clearing orders of derivatives originated in stock exchange transactions, the calculation and valuation of open contracts will be made at least every hour, so as to provide updated information on net open contracts and on the evolution of net balances to be settled. The foregoing is based on the last prices of the market, which shall be provided by the stock exchanges to the extent there are negotiations. On a daily basis, after the closing time for the transaction date, the CCLV will perform the calculation and valuation of open contracts based on the daily settlement prices and on the settlement prices at the maturity date according to the provisions set forth in number 2.3.1.1, which shall be disclosed to the market through CCLV's information systems and the stock exchanges systems in which each series is traded.

Furthermore, with regard to the clearing orders of derivatives carried out over-the-counter authorized by the Supervisor, the calculation and valuation of open contracts will be performed after the closing of the trading day, based on the daily settlement prices and on the settlement prices on the maturity date according to the provisions set forth in number 2.3.1.2, which shall be disclosed to the market through CCLV's information systems.

The open contracts allocated to a principal may be transferred from a Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent to another at the request of the principal itself, and said transfer is to be reported to CCLV by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent to which said open contracts will be transferred and confirmed by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent that will transfer them, provided that the principal keeps a contractual relationship in effect for the performance of derivatives contracts with the corresponding Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members. These processes may be conducted, provided that the derivative is in effect and up to a time limit, which shall be established by Internal Comm at least 10 business days before its effective date. To the extent that the transfer of these open contracts is confirmed, it will be included in the calculation of net open contracts of the allocated Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent, provided always that the latter complies with the guarantees demanded, and it shall be deducted from the calculation of open net contracts of the assigning Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent. Open contracts transferred, but not confirmed, will be kept in the calculation of open net contracts of the original Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent.

2.3.1 Valuation of Open Contracts

2.3.1.1 Valuation of Open Contracts Originated From Clearing Orders of Derivatives from Stock Exchange Tradings

CLLV will value the open contracts by each series on a daily basis, using the daily settlement price as the basis for setting gains and losses of Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members, both for their own account and for each principal's account. Also, on a contract termination date, gains and losses will be established using the settlement price at maturity.

The way in which CCLV will perform the valuation of open contracts during the term and on the maturity date of each series will be governed by the following:

If contracts opened in a series registered in the same day of calculation correspond to open purchase contracts, the future price agreed upon will be deducted from the daily settlement price, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss. .

- If contracts opened in a series in effect at the beginning of the trading day correspond to open purchase contracts, the daily settlement price of the previous business day will be deducted from the daily settlement price, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.
- If contracts opened in a series registered on the maturity date of the contract correspond to open purchase contracts, the future price agreed upon will be deducted from the settlement price on the maturity date, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.
- If contracts opened in a series in full force and effect at the beginning of the maturity day of the contract correspond to open purchase contracts, the daily settlement price of the previous business day will be deducted from the settlement price established on the maturity, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.
- If the contracts opened in a series registered in the same day of calculation correspond to open sales contracts, the daily settlement price will be deducted from the future price agreed upon, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.
- If the contracts opened in a series in effect at the beginning of the trading day correspond to open sales contracts, the daily settlement price will be deducted from the daily settlement price of the previous business day, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.

- If the contracts opened in a series registered on the maturity date of the contract correspond to open sales contracts, the settlement price on the maturity date will be deducted from the future price agreed upon, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.
- If the contracts opened in a series in effect at the beginning of the maturity date of the contract correspond to open sales contracts, the settlement price established on the maturity date will be deducted from the daily settlement price of the previous business day, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.

For derivatives instruments with a future price agreed at rates, the valuation of open purchase and sales contracts will be performed during the effective term and on the maturity date of each series as the difference of the amount resulting from the valuation of each series according to the agreed rate and the amount resulting from the valuation of each series based on the daily settlement or maturity rate, as applicable, multiplied by the number of open contracts following the previously mentioned calculation method .

The daily settlement price will be daily determined as the weighted average of the prices obtained from the transactions of futures contracts carried out within a certain time frame of the trading session according to the time schedule defined in each futures contracts. Its value is calculated according to the following formula:

$$PL_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n P_i C_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n C_i}$$

Where:

- PL_t : Daily settlement Price/Rate of the futures contract on day t.
n : number of transactions made within a certain time frame of the trading session.
P_i : Future Price/Rate agreed at the i-th transaction.
C_i : N° of contracts traded at the i-th transaction

In the event that the CCLV determines that the daily settlement price obtained by the method mentioned above does not represent the market value of a series with respect to specific conditions referring to amounts, number of transactions, volatility of the series and the underlying asset, liquidity, market depth, or represents a financial risk for the central counterparty entity, it may reserve the right to determine a daily settlement price by selecting one of the prices obtained through alternative methods, depending on the previously mentioned specific conditions.

The methods that CCLV may use to determine the daily settlement prices of each series, alternatively to the daily settlement price set in each futures contract, will correspond to those defined below in priority order:

- a) Settlement Price: The daily settlement price may be determined as the weighted average price of the prices obtained from the transaction of futures contracts carried out within a certain time frame different from the one mentioned above.

The calculation of the daily settlement price through this methodology is governed by the following formula:

$$PL_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n P_i C_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n C_i}$$

Where:

- PL_t : Daily settlement Price/Rate of the futures contract on day t.
n : number of transactions carried out within a certain time frame of the trading session before that mentioned according to the hours defined in each futures contract
P_i : Future Price/Rate agreed at the i-th transaction
C_i : N° of contracts traded at the i-th transaction

- b) Price Standardization: The standardization of prices refers to the use of derivatives prices that are similar in terms, currency and underlying asset, based on which the daily settlement price will be determined. The prices used may correspond to the values obtained from clearing orders entered during the calculation day or values from other liquid markets.

For all futures contracts referring to the same underlying asset and maturity date, but with a different round lot, a daily settlement price could be applied to all contracts complying with the conditions previously mentioned.

- c) Theoretical Valuation by Models: The daily settlement price may be determined based on the estimate of a theoretical price by valuation models that may vary according to the underlying asset, term and currency of the applicable futures contract. Since the

daily settlement price corresponds to the value that would have been obtained from a free exchange based on market conditions, the valuation by models incorporates those factors that the market would have normally considered to fix the price for a derivative instrument of the same characteristics as to structure of flows, rates of interest, currencies, etc.

The theoretical valuation by models of a future price is given by the following formula:

$$F(t, T) = S_t * (1 + r_{t,T} * (T - t))$$

Where:

$F(t, T)$:	Theoretical price of a future contract
$r_{t,T}$:	interest rate free of risk between t and T
S_t	:	Value of the underlying asset in t necessary for a strategy that generates 1 unit of underlying asset in T.
T	:	Maturity date of a future contract

The valuation models associated with each series will be informed on the Web site CCLV/Derivatives.

The determination of theoretical prices differentiated by their underlying asset, term and currency require different kinds of inputs. Models applied by the CCLV incorporate updated and reliable information about market conditions at the valuation time and factors that may influence the market value of such instrument, such as the exchange rates and *Unidad de Fomento* (Indexation Unit) provided by the Chilean Central Bank, trading indexes and prices of shares provided by the stock exchanges, curves of interest rates free of risk, curves of interbank rates in pesos, in UF units and in US dollars, among others, provided by suppliers widely validated by the market, such as Bloomberg, Reuters or other providers of prices.

The CCLV may reserve the right to determine a daily settlement price by methods alternative to those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, should it consider that such prices are not representative under high volatility conditions, of abnormal volumes of clearing orders or in any news or information on the condition of the domestic and international financial system that could affect the daily settlement pricing, thus representing a financial risk for the central counterparty entity. In such a case, notice of that fact will be given to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor in the business day after its occurrence.

High volatility shall mean that range of price fluctuations both in derivatives and in the risk factors with an occurrence probability below 1% during one transaction day. Also, those amounts associated with open contracts and the underlying asset that have an occurrence probability below 1% during one day of transaction are considered as abnormal volume. Such a calculation shall be based at least on the last 250 business days.

The CCLV will monthly inform the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor through the CCLV-Derivatives Methodological Report , about those calculation methodologies used to determine the daily settlement price of futures contracts along with the specific parameters used in the event they correspond to a methodology different from the one that is described herein. The CCLV-Derivatives Methodological Report will be published on the CCLV/Derivatives web site, as well as the selection of methods described in the preceding paragraphs for the determination of the daily settlement price of each series.

2.3.1.2 Valuation of Open Contracts Originated From Clearing Orders of Derivatives from Over-The-Counter Transactions

CLLV will value open contracts for each series on a daily basis, using the daily settlement price as the basis to establish profits and losses of Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members, both for their own accounts and for each principal's account. Also, profits and losses shall be determined on the expiration date of a contract, the settlement price at maturity.

Profits or losses calculated on the expiration date of the contracts shall be incorporated in the net balances to be settled by each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent.

The way in which CCLV will perform the valuation of open contracts during the effective term and on the maturity date of each series, will be governed by the following:

- If the contracts open in a series correspond to open purchase contracts, the forward price agreed upon will be deducted from the daily settlement price, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.
- If the contracts open in a series registered in full force and effect on the maturity date of the contract correspond to open purchase contracts, the forward price agreed upon will be deducted from the settlement price at maturity, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.
- If the contracts open in a series correspond to open sale contracts, the daily settlement price will be deducted from the forward price agreed, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.
- If the contracts open in a series in full force and effect on the maturity date of the contract correspond to open sales contracts, the settlement price at maturity will be

deducted from the forward price agreed upon, and then multiplied by the round lot and the number of open contracts. If this result is positive, it will have generated a profit and if this result is negative, it will have generated a loss.

The daily settlement price will be daily calculated by CCLV for each derivative instrument associated with an underlying asset and the fixed term. To this effect, such elements as liquidity and volatility of derivatives and its underlying asset will be considered. The daily settlement price will be obtained by one of the following methods specified in the forward contract:

- a) Price Standardization: The standardization of prices refers to the use of derivatives prices that are similar in terms, currency and underlying asset, based on which the daily settlement price will be determined. The prices used may correspond to the values obtained from clearing orders entered during the calculation day or values from other liquid markets..

For all derivatives traded over-the-counter authorized by the Supervisor referring to the same underlying asset and the same maturity date as a future instrument traded on the stock exchange, the daily settlement price of the latter could be applied to the forward contracts mentioned above.

- b) Theoretical Valuation by Models: The daily settlement price may be determined based on the estimate of a theoretical price by valuation models that can vary according to the underlying asset, term and currency of the applicable forward contract. Since the daily settlement price corresponds to the value that would have been obtained from a free exchange based on market conditions, the valuation by models incorporates those factors that the market would have normally considered to fix the price for a derivative of the same characteristics as to structure of flows, rates of interest, currencies, etc. The theoretical valuation by models of a forward price is given by the following formula:

$$F(t, T) = S_t * (1 + r_{t,T} * (T - t))$$

Where:

- $F(t, T)$: Theoretical price of a forward contract
 $r_{t,T}$: interest rate free of risk between t and T
 S_t : Value of the underlying asset in t necessary for a strategy that generates 1 unit of underlying asset in T.
T : Maturity date of a forward contract

The valuation models associated with each series will be informed on the CCLV/Derivatives Web site .

The determination of theoretical prices differentiated by their underlying asset, term and currency require different kinds of inputs. Models applied by the CCLV incorporate

updated and reliable information about market conditions at the valuation time and factors that may influence on the market value of said instrument, such as the exchange rates and *Unidad de Fomento (UF)* (Indexation Unit) provided by the Chilean Central Bank, trading indexes and prices of shares provided by the stock exchanges, curves of interest rates free of risk, curves of interbank rates in pesos, in UF units and in US dollars, among others, provided by suppliers widely validated by the market, such as Bloomberg, Reuters or other providers of prices.

In the event the CCLV determines that the daily settlement price obtained through the methods specified in the forward contract above does not represent the market value with respect to specific conditions referring to amounts, number of transactions, volatility, liquidity, market depth, or that it represents a financial risk for the central counterparty entity, it may reserve the right to determine a daily settlement price by selecting one of the prices obtained through the methods described in the preceding paragraphs, the selection of which shall depend on the specific conditions outlined above.

The CCLV may reserve the right to determine a daily settlement price by methods alternative to those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, in the event it considers that such prices are not representative under conditions of high volatility conditions, or of abnormal volumes of clearing orders, or in case of any news or information on the status or condition of the domestic and international financial system that could affect the daily settlement pricing, thus representing a financial risk for the central counterparty entity. In such a case, notice of that fact will be given to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor in the business day after its occurrence..

High volatility shall mean that range of price fluctuations both in the derivatives and in the risk factors with an occurrence probability below 1% during one transaction day. Also, those amounts associated with open contracts and the underlying asset that have an occurrence probability below 1% during one day of transaction are considered as abnormal volume. Such a calculation shall be based at least on the last 250 business days.

The CCLV will monthly inform the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor through the CCLV-Derivatives Methodological Report, about the calculation methodologies used to determine the daily settlement price of forward contracts along with the specific parameters used in the event they correspond to a methodology different from the one described herein. The CCLV-Derivatives Methodological Report will be published on the CCLV/Derivatives web site, as well as the selection of methods described in the preceding paragraphs for the determination of the daily settlement price of each series.

2.4 Acceptance of Clearing Orders of Derivatives

The acceptance corresponds to the process by which the clearing orders entered from the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members become final and irrevocable.

As from the acceptance date of the clearing orders of derivatives, the CCLV irrevocably becomes creditor and debtor of the rights and obligations resulting from the clearing orders accepted by the system.

2.4.1 Acceptance of Clearing Orders of Derivatives from Stock Exchanges

Clearing orders of derivatives from transactions performed in any of the stock exchanges authorized by the Supervisor shall be accepted in line with the registration of such orders in the CCLV system.

Without prejudice to the foregoing, the CCLV will perform the following procedures:

- For each clearing order entered, its impact on the level of guarantees required and entered and their difference as well as on the use of its intra-daily risk limit, its concentration limit and its limit of open contracts shall be verified, and such verification shall be permanently monitored by CCLV.
- As long as each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent allocates the clearing orders entered to the system, the CCLV will update the level of guarantees required, both on its own account and on the account of its principals, and the use level of its intra-daily risk limit. Moreover, along with the allocation the following will be updated: the use of the concentration limit and the limit of open contracts by each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and its principals, so as to verify that they are within the previously established limits.
- The system will provide each Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent with updated information, on its own account and on the account of their principals', about its level of guarantees entered and required, and compliance with its concentration limits, open contracts and intra-daily risk as stated in numbers 2.6.3.1, 2.6.4.1, 2.6.4.2 and 2.6.4.4. The purpose of this is that the Clearing Agent /Indirect Clearing Agent may timely take all measures to enable it to operate in the clearing and settlement system of derivatives.
- During the trading day, CCLV will calculate the net open contracts on its own account and on its principals' account, and the net balance to be settled on next day, in order to verify that each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent may at all times have enough guarantees to cover its demand for guarantees under the terms stated in these Rules, and that keeps its limit of concentration, limit of open contracts and intra-daily limit of risk within the limits set forth by the CCLV.
- In the event that the CCLV requires from the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent to complete the cash or securities to cover the deficit of guarantees as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the CCLV will take the necessary steps in order that the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent meets the new required

standards within the term defined by it, which shall be within the trading day according to what is mentioned in paragraph 2.6 of this Section.

- If, at any time during the trading day, the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent does not comply with the concentration limits previously set forth, the CCLV will immediately request additional guarantees, because the limit has been exceeded, which shall be immediately allocated to the level of guarantees demanded and entered by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent. In order to restore the use of the concentration limit within the levels set forth by the CCLV, the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent may close open contracts; otherwise, it must deposit the previously mentioned additional guarantees. .
- If the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent exceeds its limit of open contracts during the trading day, the CCLV may request to close the open contracts in excess, so that it to meets the levels set forth by the CCLV.
- If the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent does not complete the deficit of demanded guarantees, the CCLV shall ask for a day trading call, which shall be entered within the term required.
- If the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent exceeds its intra-daily risk limit, the CCLV will immediately ask the stock exchanges to suspend the admission of transactions in the trading systems of derivatives that involve an increased exposure of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent with the CCLV or to suspend any admission of transactions by the trading systems of derivatives. This measure shall remain in effect until the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent regulates its situation according to the provisions set forth in paragraph 2.6.4.2 of this Section.

Once the process to accept and determine net balances has ended, the CCLV will report through its information systems, the balances and open net contracts that will be settled and cleared through the daily settlement process.

The clearing orders that have been confirmed on the stock exchanges systems where the transaction was carried out according to its internal regulations will be accepted. The applicable exchange will be responsible for the completeness and truthfulness of such information.

The termination or modification of clearing orders of derivatives from the stock exchanges will be exceptionally made up to a time set by the CCLV on the date the order is entered and which will be notified through Internal Comm no later than 10 business days before the effective date thereof, and at the request of the stock exchange where the transaction was made under the powers set in the applicable operation manuals regarding the correction and annulment of transactions.

Such termination or modification will be made by automatic registration with the relevant stock exchanges and the CCLV, modifying the registration of CCLV systems with the new updated information. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CCLV reserves the right to accept

such changes to the clearing orders of derivatives as long as the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members have enough guarantees to cover the corresponding open contracts.

In the event the CCLV rejects the termination or modification, the previously accepted clearing order of derivatives will remain unchanged. This proceeding shall be notified in writing by electronic mail or by letter addressed to the General Manager of the stock exchange through which the termination or modification request was made or to the person acting as such.

The acceptance of terminations and changes in transactions already accepted after the time indicated will not be allowed under these Rules.

The acceptance of terminations and modifications of transactions already accepted before the time previously indicated will be notified to the Discipline Committee in an attached report on a monthly basis.

Once the process of acceptance and determination of net balances has been accomplished, the resulting net debit and credit balances will be considered balances pending settlement, and such condition will continue until the relevant settlement process.

2.4.2 Acceptance of Clearing Orders of Derivatives from transactions Performed Over-The-Counter

Acceptance of clearing orders from over-the-counter transactions authorized by the Supervisor shall be subject to the level of guarantee entered and compliance with price fluctuation limits according to those mentioned in paragraph 2.6.4.3.2. Orders may be accepted in the acceptance process to be carried out until 10:00 p.m. of the same day the order was entered, and those orders that do not comply with the requirements stated in these rules will be rejected.

The procedure to accept the clearing orders will be as follows:

- The acceptance of clearing orders by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent will be based on the level of guarantees demanded and entered, calculated on the net balances, open contracts and the risk level thereof.
- The system will provide each Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent with updated information, on its own account and on their principals' account, about the levels of guarantees entered, required guarantees, and intra-daily risk as stated in paragraph 2.6.4.2. The purpose of this is that the Clearing Agent /Indirect Clearing Agent may timely take all measures to enable acceptance of all orders in the CCLV system.
- For each clearing order entered, its impact on the level of guarantees required and entered and their difference as well as on the use of its intra-daily risk limit shall be

verified, and such verification shall be permanently monitored by CCLV. Additionally, it will be verified that the price reported in the clearing order does not exceed the price fluctuation limits set forth by the CCLV.

- Prior to the acceptance process, the CCLV will determine the net open contracts and the net balance to be settled on the next day, in order to verify that every Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent has enough guarantees entered to cover its requirement of guarantees.
- In the event that the CCLV requires from the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent to complete the cash or securities to cover the deficit of guarantees as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the CCLV will take the necessary steps for the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent to meet the new standards required within the timeframe defined by it, which shall be within the trading day according to what is mentioned in paragraph 2.6 of this Section.
- If the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent does not complete the deficit of guarantees demanded within the term determined by the CCLV, those orders the required guarantees of which are equal to the amount of the deficit guarantees will not be accepted, and they shall be deemed rejected. In addition, those clearing orders that do not comply with the price fluctuation limits will not be accepted. Thus, orders will be taken out of the system and shall be settled bilaterally by the parties that participated in the transaction without the participation of CCLV.
- The criterion to define the orders rejected from acceptance will be implemented on a sequential basis from the last order entered in the system backwards.
- The CCLV will report to the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members on the clearing orders rejected due to lack of guarantees and noncompliance with the price fluctuation limits. .

Prior the acceptance process, the CCLV may make an analysis of risks based on the amount, term and currencies of the clearing orders of derivatives from over-the-counter transactions, based on the financial standing of the involved institutions and the context of the domestic and the international financial market.

Once the process of acceptance and determination of net balances has ended, the CCLV will communicate – through its information systems – the net open contracts and balances to be settled and cleared through the daily settlement process.

Clearing orders already confirmed by the parties involved in the transaction will be accepted according to the provisions set forth in these Rules. The parties will be responsible for the completeness and truthfulness of such information.

The termination or modification of the clearing orders of derivatives originated from over-the-counter transactions authorized by the Supervisor will be exceptionally carried out during the day the order was entered at the request of the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members involved up to the time set forth by the CCLV, which in no case may exceed the acceptance process timeframe which is performed until 08:00 p.m. The

procedure and the time limit to give notice of terminations or modifications will be reported by an Internal Comm 10 business days before the effective date thereof.

Such termination or modification will be performed by registration by the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members or by those empowered to send such information, and by the CCLV, and the CCLV system's records shall be replaced by the new updated information. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CCLV reserves the right to accept these changes in the clearing orders of derivatives as long as the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members have enough guarantees to cover the applicable open contracts.

If the CCLV rejects the termination or modification, the clearing order will not suffer any changes and this fact will be reported in writing, by electronic mail or letter addressed to the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent that has directly made such request.

The acceptance of terminations and modifications of transactions already accepted after the start of the last acceptance process will not be allowed under these Rules.

The acceptance of terminations and modifications of transactions will be notified to the Discipline Committee in an attached report on a monthly basis.

Once the process of acceptance and determination of the net balances has been accomplished, the resulting net debit and credit balances will be considered balances pending settlement, and such condition will continue until the relevant settlement process.

2.5 Daily Settlement

The settlement process to extinguish the net balances pending to be settled originated by clearing orders accepted for derivatives from stock exchange orders and over-the-counter transactions authorized by the Supervisor, will be performed on a daily basis according to the results obtained at the end of the process to accept and determine the credit and debit net balances for each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent.

Thus, acting as Central Counterparty, CCLV irrevocably becomes, from the time it accepts the clearing orders, as creditor and debtor of the rights and obligations resulting from such orders according to the provisions set forth in section e 12 of Law N° 20,345. For the purposes of removing the risk from the clearing of already accepted orders of derivatives, CCLV shall use the financial safeguard mechanisms set forth in these Rules.

2.5.1 Balance Coverage Process

From the time the net balances pending to be paid are declared and until a fixed time on the settlement day – which will be communicated through Internal Communications at least 10 business days before the effective date thereof– the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members with debit net balance shall instruct the corresponding banks about

transferring from their banking accounts - from among those mentioned in Section B - through the RTGS system, the required funds to the CCLV's cash current account in the Central Bank of Chile, so that these funds may be credited and become available in said account no later than on the date and time mentioned above. The amount of this transfer of cash should be independent for the clearing and settlement of derivatives, i.e., it may not be cleared with any other cash obligations that the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent may have in effect for its participation in the clearing and settlement of other financial instruments that are different from the derivatives.

In order to adjust to the time schedule mentioned above, the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall take all possible steps and proceedings to meet their obligations whether by speeding up the settlement processes before third parties, by obtaining loans in cash or using credit lines as applicable.

Every time a Clearing Agent and/or Indirect Clearing Agent does not pay the total cash corresponding to its net debit balance during the coverage process, CCLV will immediately report such default to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor and to the stock exchanges.

The Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members who fail to comply with their obligation to pay the relevant cash amounts during the coverage process shall be subject to the disciplinary measures set forth in the Section of Penalties and Fines of these Operations Rules.

2.5.2 Non Covered Balance Supplement Process

If after the end of the coverage process any Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent shows uncovered net balances, CCLV will be immediately informed about the nature of this default stating the origin and principal involved, if applicable, in order to identify such default and take the measures CCLV may deem convenient to ensure the settlement process.

The time at which the complementation process will start and end shall be set by Internal Communications, at least 10 business days before its term and it may not be less than 60 minutes. Without prejudice to the foregoing, this process may take less, provided that balances and positions in default are totally paid.

In this respect, the procedures to be performed by CCLV are as follows:

- a) In the event of any default attributable to a principal and that CCLV verifies that the net balance not covered by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent corresponds only to the net balance in default by such principal, the defaulting principal's guarantees in excess shall be immediately allocated to the settlement and clearing of derivatives through the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent, through which said default was generated, and then the guarantees in excess of the

corresponding Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent. Should guarantees in excess of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent be resorted to, those entered for the clearing and settlement of derivatives will be used at first, and then those entered in excess for the clearing and settlement of other financial instruments different from derivatives, in that order.

- b) In the event of any default attributable to the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and that CCLV verifies that the net balance not covered corresponds only to the net balance thereof, or if the Agent does not inform on the nature of default, the own guarantees in excess of the defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent will be immediately used, at first considering the guarantees entered in excess for the clearing and settlement of derivatives and then those entered in excess for the clearing and settlement of other financial instruments different from derivatives, in that order.

For all purposes, cash and securities deposited as collateral by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent on its own account, shall be subject to the provisions set forth in sections 26 and 27 of Law N° 20,345 in order to secure the performance of the obligations undertaken by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent to CCLV for their own transactions, and on the account of their Indirect Clearing Members and their principals, as applicable.

Guarantees in excess as stated in the preceding paragraphs will be used based on the cash paid or by performing the repos with the relevant instruments.

In no case as mentioned above, the CCLV will use guarantees in excess allocated to the principals of the defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and the guarantees in excess of other Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and their principals not involved in the default.

Should there be any delinquent balances, CCLV shall instruct the applicable banks to transfer the funds corresponding to the payment from its banking current accounts held with financial institutions to its banking current account in cash kept with the Central Bank of Chile in order to complete any missing balances and perform the financial settlement up to the amount required by these Rules for their credit facilities.

Once the supplementary process has ended, the Clearing Members and/or Indirect Clearing Members not making any cash payments, shall pay them in full to CCLV as soon as possible within the settlement day, so that CCLV may repay the loans and/or be reimbursed of the financial resources provided used to cover any delinquent balances .

Notwithstanding the foregoing and in order to back-up and guarantee the mechanisms described herein and used to cover the defaults, CCLV shall not allow the withdrawal of the guarantees entered by the defaulting Agent while there are balances in default.

Under this circumstance, CCLV shall be considered specially empowered and instructed by the corresponding Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent to proceed as already described, and such circumstance shall be expressly recorded in the adhesion contract undersigned by the Agents mentioned above.

Should any balances in default covered by CCLV have not been paid by the defaulting Agent It, CCLV shall foreclose the withheld guarantees of the principal and the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent, as applicable, and the guarantee fund of derivatives according to the procedures described in the extraordinary settlement process in order to cover the balances contributed by CCLV. Should the guarantee fund be used, the balances of the affected Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be first covered and then those belonging to CCLV.

In none of the cases mentioned above, will the CCLV dispose of the non-defaulting principals' guarantees.

Moreover, the CCLV will be empowered to proceed to the forced closing of the open contracts held by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent in their own account, and the forced closing of the open contracts of the defaulting principal, if applicable.

As an additional measure, the CCLV may transfer from the defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent the open contracts and guarantees entered in the CCLV on behalf of the non-defaulting principals to other non-defaulting Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members and with whom the principal has a contractual relationship in full force and effect for the execution of derivatives contracts or to perform the forced closing of the open contracts from each principal, when such transfer may not be performed due to non-conformity of a principal as to the transfer to be made, or when the principal does not have a contractual relationship in full force and effect for the execution of derivatives contracts with the Agents to whom the open contracts would be transferred.

Costs incurred in obtaining the use of resources and credit lines by CCLV shall be borne by the defaulting Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent.

The defaulting Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be subject to the disciplinary measures set forth in the Section of Penalties and Fines of these Rules, and such situation shall be reported to the Discipline Committee.

2.5.3 Balance Verification Process

At the end of the supplementary process and prior to the commencement of the settlement process described below, CCLV shall verify any cash balances and instruments available in the banking current account in cash held by CCLV with the Central Bank of Chile. The schedule at which this process shall start and end will be established by Internal Communications at least 10 business days prior to its effective date.

The credit balances affected by the debit balances the cash amount of which is not available in the banking current account kept by CCLV with the Central Bank of Chile, and once CCLV has complied with all the formalities indicated in the preceding paragraph, it shall pass to the settlement extraordinary process described in these Rules.

The procedure to select the credit balances being affected by the non-fulfillment shall be carried out based on the criterion of affecting the fewest number of counterparties as possible, by prioritizing the selection of Clearing Members over the Indirect Clearing Members, and on the date the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members covered the balances and the origin of those balances in default, following such priority order.

In the event of default by a principal, the CCLV may prevent the withdrawal of guarantees entered by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent on the account of the corresponding principal registered thereunder by the CCLV, and those entered by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent themselves which gave rise to such default.. If a Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent fails to comply with their obligations on their own account, the CCLV may prevent the withdrawal of the guarantees entered.

In the event a Clearing Agent becomes in default, the Indirect Clearing Members and the principals operating through them shall not be affected by the actions described above provided that they have fulfilled their obligations.

In the event an Indirect Clearing Agent becomes in default, the CCLV will not allow the withdrawal of the guarantees entered by it or its Clearing Members.

All of the foregoing is intended to support repos, as well as to contribute the necessary resources to cover the obligations arising during and at the end of the extraordinary settlement process.

The result of the calculation and procedure for the suspension of the cash transfer shall be immediately notified to the affected parties by a direct communication to the General Manager or to his substitute, indicating the reasons for such a measure, as well as the amount and background information of the defaulting Indirect Clearing Agent, if applicable.

The detailed list of any delinquent balances shall be reported through CCLV information systems. .

2.5.4 Balance Settlement Process (Settlement Time Schedule)

At the end of the verification process, CCLV shall implement the settlement process where balances covered under the procedure described below will be settled. The time frame within which this process will take place shall be established through Internal Communications at least 10 business days prior to its effective date.

Settlement of balances:

- Transfer of funds under the instructions for payment provided to the RTGS System – from the banking current account in cash held by CCLV with the Central Bank of Chile, to the participants of such system of payments where the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members hold their corresponding banking current accounts with net credit balance. These transfers of funds will be made subject to the rules and instructions given by the Central Bank of Chile for this kind of transactions.

By verifying the implementation of the prior process in the system managed by the Central Bank of Chile, the settlement process shall be considered ended.

The detail of settled balances shall be reported through CCLV information systems..

Without prejudice to the schedules set forth through Internal Communications according to the provisions set forth herein, CCLV may proceed to the early settlement of any outstanding balances, under the condition that the fulfillment of all Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members is verified as regards the payment of their net debit balances, in which case the closing time shall be subject to the fulfillment of these conditions.

2.5.5 Extraordinary Settlement Process

The purpose of the extraordinary settlement process is to manage and settle any delinquent balances according to the provisions set forth in these Rules.

The extraordinary term to settle such defaults may not extend beyond 12:00 pm of the next settlement business day.

CCLV shall continue automatically incorporating delinquent balances into the next calculation processes of current guarantees during the whole period of default.

In the event the default has been identified and attributed to a principal, first the guarantees provided by the Clearing Agent on behalf of the defaulting principal will be

foreclosed. Should the guarantees be insufficient or should the the Clearing Agent be in default, the own guarantees of the defaulting Agent will be first foreclosed, entered for the clearing and settlement of derivatives and the guarantees entered in excess by the relevant Agent for the clearing and settlement of financial instruments other than the derivatives, in such order. Likewise, in the event the default has been identified and attributed to a principal of an Indirect Clearing Agent, first the guarantees established by the Indirect Clearing Agent on the account of the defaulting principal will be foreclosed. Should such guarantees be insufficient or should the Indirect Clearing Agent be in default, the own guarantees of both the defaulting Indirect Clearing Agent and those of its Clearing Agent will be foreclosed, entered for the clearing and settlement of derivatives and the guarantees entered in excess by the relevant Agent for the clearing and settlement of financial instruments other than the derivatives, in such order.

Then, the guarantee fund of derivatives may be used as a separate trust fund, and managed by CCLV. Thus, CCLV will first use a maximum amount equivalent to the contribution of the defaulting Clearing Agent and then the available amount required to cover the obligation or obligations in default. In any of the cases described above, the CCLV will dispose of the guarantees of non-defaulting principals. .

The defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent in default shall take all necessary steps to pay all its delinquent balances, instructing the relevant bank to make the relevant deposits in the cash current account held by CCLV in the Central Bank of Chile by giving the corresponding funds transfer instruction (*Instrucción de Transferencia de Fondos*) (ITF - By its acronym in Spanish). If the defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent delivers such missing cash to CCLV before 12:00 pm of the business day immediately following the settlement day, the CCLV will immediately give the relevant ITF (fund transfer instructions) which shall be charged to its cash current account, for the benefit of the bank or banks where the affected Agents hold their current accounts, thus implementing the required cash transfer, subject to the business hours of the RTGS System and shall proceed to extinguish the related obligations. Anyway, the defaulting Agent shall be liable for the payment of the cost of using CCLV's own resources or those of third parties'.

Once the outstanding obligations have been fully paid, the CCLV shall release the remaining guarantees withheld of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and the principal, as appropriate.

Without prejudice to the foregoing and in order to obtain the cash required to settle the delinquent balances and the obligations in default to CCLV not later than 12:00 pm the next business day after the settlement date , CCLV will arrange loans in cash and repos. To this effect, the guarantees levied by the principals, the respective Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members, as applicable, shall be pledged in favor of the financial entities granting such loans or performing repos, first using the instruments issued by the Central Bank of Chile and the General Treasury of the Republic of Chile.

Repos will be carried out by instructing one or more brokers to execute them as soon as possible, up to the amount necessary amount to cover the outstanding cash balance. The delinquent balances will be settled immediately after the cash proceeds from such sale are received according to the terms of the settlement transactions on the stock exchange.

Furthermore, the CCLV may sell the guarantees levied by the defaulting Clearing Agent, the Indirect Clearing Agent and its principals on their own account, as applicable in order to obtain the cash amount required to settle all delinquent balances and obligations in default to the CCLV in such order.

This sale shall be implemented by giving instructions to one or more brokers, to execute it as soon as possible on the stock market up to the amount necessary to cover the delinquent cash balance and any fines imposed as a consequence of such default. Delinquent balances shall be settled immediately after the cash proceeds from such sale are received according to the terms of the settlement transactions on the stock exchange.

Should the funds required to cover the outstanding cash balance and fines for default not be raised, the guarantee fund of derivatives shall be allocated to cancel the outstanding amount according to the procedure mentioned in paragraph 2.6.5 of this Section.

Moreover, should there still be any deficit the CCLV will dispose of the assets existing in the reserve fund according to the provisions mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Section and, then, those goods of its own assets to pay the affected Agents.

Once the necessary funds to settle any obligations in default are collected, the CCLV will immediately give the corresponding funds transfer instruction (ITF) which shall be charged to its cash current account, for the benefit of the bank or banks where the affected Agents hold their current accounts, thus implementing the required cash transfer, subject to the business hours of the RTGS System and shall proceed to extinguish the related obligations..

When CCLV's own resources have been allocated to pay balances in default or to perform those transactions to collect the necessary funds to settle or cure the default, the CCLV shall transfer any costs incurred, in addition to the penalty applied to this kind of to the defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent or who has given rise to such default, which will be defined by the CCLV and informed to such Agents on a regular basis.

Along with the foregoing, the CCLV may perform the forced closing of open contracts on the own account of the defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent or the defaulting the principal or to both of them, as appropriate. To this effect, the CCLV –on behalf of the defaulting party - will perform transactions contrary to the open contracts in effect, of each series registered with the CCLV system on the account of the latter, directly or through one or more brokers or banks, in order to close the corresponding open contracts. Transactions involving open contracts arising from clearing orders from stock exchanges, will be performed through the trading systems provided by said stock exchanges, while transactions involving open contracts arising from clearing orders from over-the counter transactions will be performed by CCLV on such market.

The specific rules, characteristics and procedures through which CCLV performs transactions aimed at the forced closing of open contracts, will be informed by an Internal Comm at least 10 days prior to its effective date

Once the transactions required to implement the forced closing mechanism of the corresponding contracts have been performed, they will be registered in the CCLV system to the own account of the defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent or of the defaulting principal, as applicable, regardless of any disciplinary measure imposed on the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and in effect at the time the forced closing is performed. The criterion to define the order of execution of the forced closing will be sequential, from the open contracts of the series that generates the higher current guarantee calculation of , considering the liquidity of the applicable series. The CCLV may adopt a different criterion for qualified cases and shall inform the Supervisor about the criteria adopted for these purposes.

The CCLV may also determine the transfer of open contracts and the guarantees made on behalf of principals not related to the default incurred by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent, to other Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members not related to the default, and shall be able to do so either totally or partially, as they may deem it appropriate. The transfer may be made subject to the prior confirmation of the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members appointed by the CCLV to which the open contracts and the guarantees will be transferred, and only if the involved principals keep a contractual relationship in full force and effect for the execution of contracts of derivatives with said Agents. If the transfer of open contracts cannot be performed due to a principal's disagreement therewith, or because the principal does not maintain a contractual relationship in full force and effect for the execution of derivatives contracts with the Agents to which the open contracts would be transferred, the CCLV may implement the forced closing of the open contracts of the principals of the defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent.

The foregoing is without prejudice to any judicial and/or extrajudicial actions that may be brought against the Clearing Agent and/or Indirect Clearing Agent by the CCLV, which shall not be an obstacle to settle any delinquent balances at 12:00 pm of the next business day from the original settlement date.

Without prejudice to the foregoing, if at the end of the settlement day, the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent has not canceled its cash balance to the CCLV, the latter may, in the same day, request the stock exchanges to suspend the trading systems, when they act as broker or direct operator, and it shall suspend the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent to perform transactions, and shall not allowing the admission of new clearing orders. This situation will be reported to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor and to the Discipline Committee. The operating suspension will be in full force until the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent regularizes the reasons that have caused such suspension.

This process will be implemented by a direct communication during the same default day addressed to the General Manager, or his substitute, of the corresponding stock exchanges through which the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent operates. Such

communication will describe in detail the reasons for such a request and a copy of that request will be sent in the same day to the General Manager of the defaulting Agent and of the defaulting Clearing Members, in the event the defaulting party is an Indirect Clearing Agent, and also to the agencies mentioned above.

The Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent who is suspended will continue to be responsible for the settlement of open contracts and delinquent balances corresponding to the clearing orders of derivatives admitted and accepted by the CCLV before such suspension. Moreover, the suspended Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent must still be bound to meet the other obligations set forth in these Rules.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, and in special cases of risks for the clearing and settlement process entrusted to the Central Counterparty System, i.e., extraordinary events affecting a high number of counterparties or involving significant amounts in default meeting any of the characteristics listed in i) of the C type penalties mentioned in paragraph 1, Section G, Operation Rules, insufficiency of guarantees, default in payments by one or more Clearing Members and/or Indirect Clearing Members, non-operation or non-access to the RTGS system of the Central Bank of Chile, non-operation or non-access to the securities transfer systems of the Central Securities Depository, suspensions to trade on the market and on the financial system or in any other events of similar nature, CCLV may exceptionally decide on other contingent settlement mechanisms, and shall give notice thereof duly in advance to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor and the Central Bank of Chile in the same day the event occurs. This procedure does not require authorization or any other statement for execution purposes, taking into account in any case the rules applicable to the RTGS Systems and the contingent mechanisms provided thereby.

2.6 Financial Safeguards

2.6.1 General Provisions

The specific model of risks for the clearing and settlement of derivatives is composed of different mechanisms of financial safeguards designed to properly manage the risks caused by the business own operation, including the contingency where any Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent is unable to honor its obligations to the CCLV for transactions performed on their own account or on the principals' account, forcing them to take measures in order to safeguard the settlement, both in time and form, through extraordinary procedures.

The financial safeguards and management of guarantees applied by the CCLV to the clearing and settlement of derivatives is done separately and regardless of the clearing and compensation of variable income instruments, the clearing and settlement of fixed-income instruments and financial intermediation under the condition of settlement payable tomorrow (PT) and the clearing and settlement of fixed-income instruments, financial

intermediation and variable income associated with the simultaneous transactions under the condition of settlement payable today (PTo).

The financial safeguard mechanisms adopted by the CCLV include demanding from the Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members to meet creditworthiness and liquidity requirements, as set forth in Section B of these Rules, the request of the demanded guarantees, which are calculated based on the minimum guarantees, the current guarantees and the additional guarantees as indicated in paragraphs 2.6.3.2, 2.6.3.3 and 2.6.3.4 below, the setting of limits as mentioned in paragraph 2.6.4 below, and the contributions to the guarantee fund for derivatives referred to in paragraph 2.6.5 of this Section, as applicable. These limits and the demands for guarantees, along with the reserve fund, established by the company according to the provisions set forth mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Section, the use of credit lines by the CCLV as indicated in paragraph 2.6.2 and CCLV's own equity are intended to cover and limit the risks that may arise from the settlement of the rights and obligations under the open contracts of the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members on their own accounts and on account of their principals as set forth in these Rules.

Such financial safeguards defined below will operate as follows:

2.6.2 CCLV's Credit Facilities

In those cases where CCLV acts as Central Counterparty of the accepted orders and the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members are unable to have access to cash funds in order to timely meet their financial obligations with the CCLV, the latter will resort to draw such funds from the credit facilities obtained from banks and instruct them to transfer such funds through the RTGS System to the banking current account in cash held with the Central Bank of Chile, to complete the missing balances and settle the clearing orders during the payout time schedule.

Therefore, CCLV will keep credit facilities with at least two banks totaling the available amount equal to or greater than the addition of:

- The amount resulting from adding the two greatest average net debit balances of the Clearing Members in the last 180 days calculated as of the last business day of the month prior to the effective date thereof, for the clearing and settlement of variable income.
- The amount resulting from adding the two greatest average net debit balances of the Clearing Members in the last 180 days calculated for the last business day of the month prior to the effective date thereof, for the clearing and settlement of derivatives.

The banks granting the credit facilities to CCLV are to be entities established in Chile reporting a capital adequacy ratio not less than 10% of its risk-weighted assets and the

time deposits of which for less than 1 year, are rated as Level 1 or above by at least two risk rating agencies from among those recorded in the register book of risk assessing companies kept by the Chilean Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions. Moreover, they shall participate in the RTGS System.

2.6.3 Individual Guarantee

2.6.3.1 Required Guarantee

Each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent shall deliver to the CCLV the required guarantee to cover the risk of the obligations arising from clearing orders on their own account and on each of its principals' account.

The guarantee required from the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members will correspond to the value resulting from calculating the minimum guarantee and the current guarantee, whichever is higher, arising from open net contracts on their own account, plus the calculation of the current guarantee arising from the open net contracts of each of their principals plus the calculation of the current guarantee arising from the open contracts not allocated, and the calculation of the required additional guarantee. .

The guarantee required at the beginning of each trading day shall be delivered until a time limit to be set through Internal Communications at least 10 business days before the effective date thereof. To this effect the following shall be considered:

- The minimum guarantee shall be reported by the CCLV on the first business day of each month to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members, and it shall keep in effect during the calendar month.
- The amount of the current guarantee calculated on the open net contracts on their own account and on account of their principals, reported as of the closing of the immediately preceding trading day shall be used for the calculation of the guarantee required to be entered at the beginning of each trading day.
- The additional guarantees will be consistent with those required on the previous trading day, provided that the request of which remains in full force and effect as provided for by CCLV.

The guarantee delivered by each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent to secure the performance of the obligations undertaken by them to the CCLV, will be consistent with the guarantee of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and the guarantees delivered on behalf of their principals. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the guarantees delivered on behalf of the principals of a Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent will exclusively cover the current guarantee and the additional guarantee calculated for each principal, reported by the CCLV and which cannot be used to cover the current guarantee of other principals or any other kind of requirements of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent.

The CCLV shall calculate and report at least every hour during the trading day, the level of current guarantees required from the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members as indicated in these Rules. Guarantee calculation time schedules will be reported through Internal Communications at least 10 business days in advance to their effective date. The impact of each clearing order admitted and registered, on the level of guarantees required and delivered will be verified and permanently monitored by the CCLV for each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent.

If from the intra-daily analysis of the required guarantees it arises that they exceed by 30% the delivered guarantees or over and above UF 20,000 – without considering the guarantees in excess delivered by each principal - the CCLV shall make a margin call for this differential at any time during the trading day, so that the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent may comply with the new levels required, which shall be paid within the period required by the CCLV which may not exceed the beginning of the calculation process of subsequent guarantees made on the trading day.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CCLV may make a margin call at any time of the day for percentages or amounts lower than those mentioned above, whenever it deems so appropriate. In this case, the period of time granted by the CCLV to the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members to pay the margin call shall depend on the risk level thereof, the percentage of guarantees required as to the entered guarantees, the concentration of open net contracts of the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent, the underlying assets of the involved instruments, the amount of the margin call and other criteria considered relevant at that time, but they may not exceed the time schedule of this system's operation day.

Moreover, the CCLV may require additional guarantees from a Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent at any time during the trading day according to the provisions of paragraph 2.6.3.4. The term provided for by the CCLV to the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent to pay such additional guarantees shall depend on the risk level thereof and the percentage of guarantees required in relation to the entered guarantees, but they may not exceed the time schedule set to pay the required guarantee at the beginning of each trading day corresponding to the next business day after which the requirement was made.

The CCLV's system of information shall provide each Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent with updated information about its levels of entered and required guarantees during the time schedule of the trading day. It shall also provide the Clearing Members with information about the level of required and entered guarantees of their Indirect Clearing Members. In addition, for information purposes, the CCLV will provide each Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent with information about the detail of guarantees required from and entered by each of their principals at least every hour during the trading day, so that it may timely adopt all measures leading to allow the admission and continuous registration of clearing orders with the CCLV system.

The guarantee required from each Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent in relation to the clearing orders on the account of a principal will be consistent with the value of the current guarantee arising from open net contracts kept by the principal through the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent, plus the value of the additional guarantee of the principal as defined in paragraph 2.6.3.4 of this Section.

Should the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent not pay the required guarantee, whether at the beginning of the day or during the period of time required, the CCLV may proceed to the forced closing of open contracts on the own account of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent or their principals, arising from accepted clearing orders, or proceed to the forced closing of open contracts still not allocated at the time the guarantee is required, as CCLV may deem convenient, for an amount equivalent to the guarantee deficit.

In order to close the corresponding open contracts, the CCLV will perform in the name of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent, certain transactions contrary to the open contracts in full force and each series registered with the CCLV system on the account of the latter, either directly or through one or more brokers or banks. In the event of open contracts arising from clearing orders from stock exchanges, the transactions will be performed through the trading systems provided by said stock exchanges, while for open contracts originated by clearing orders from operations performed over the counter, those transactions will be performed by CCLV on said market.

The specific rules, characteristics and procedures through which CCLV carries out transactions on the market in order to perform the forced closing of open contracts, will be informed by Internal Comm at least 10 days prior to their effective date.

Once the transactions allowing the application of the forced closing mechanism to the corresponding contracts have been performed, they will be registered with the CCLV system in the own account of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent or the principal, as applicable, regardless of any disciplinary measure imposed on the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and in effect at the time of the forced closing. The criterion to define the implementation order of the forced closing will be sequential from the open contracts of the series that generates the higher calculation of current guarantee, considering the liquidity of the applicable series. The CCLV may adopt a different criterion for qualified cases and shall give notice to the Supervisor of the criteria adopted for these purposes.

Also, the CCLV may determine the transfer of open contracts and the guarantees delivered to the CCVL in the name of principals not related to the failure to deliver the guarantees required by the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent from other Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members, and shall be able to do so either totally or partially, as they may deem convenient. The transfer may be made subject to the prior confirmation of the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members appointed by the CCLV to whom the

open contracts and the relevant guarantees will be transferred, and only if the principals involved keep a contractual relationship in full force effect for the performance of contracts of derivatives with said Agents. If the transfer of open contracts cannot be performed due to a principal's disagreement with the transfer transaction to be made or when a principal does not have a contractual relationship in full force effect for the performance of derivatives contracts with the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members to whom the open contracts would be transferred, the CCLV may implement the forced closing of the open contracts of the principals of the defaulting Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent.

The CCLV will impose penalties from among those defined herein, on the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members who due to the lack of guarantees have caused the forced closing and/or the transfer of open contracts.

If during the time schedule defined by the CCLV for the delivery of the required guarantee – whether at the beginning of or during the trading day – the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members fail to meet the obligations, the CCLV shall immediately request the stock exchanges to suspend them in the negotiation systems when they act as broker or direct operator, and the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall be suspended and shall not allow the admission of new clearing orders in all clearing and settlement systems managed by the CCLV, and shall give notice thereof to the Discipline Committee and the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor on the date the fact occurs . The suspension will remain operational until the Clearing / Clearing Agent Indirect regularizes his situation according to the reasons that caused such suspension.

This process shall be conducted through Direct Communications on the default day sent to the General Manager, or to the person acting as such, of the applicable stock exchange through which the Clearing Member / Indirect Clearing Member operates, stating in detail the reason of such request, and a copy thereof shall be sent to the General Manager of the defaulting Agent and of the involved Clearing Members in the same day, in the event that the defaulting party is an Indirect Clearing Member, and to the agencies mentioned above.

The suspended Clearing Member / Indirect Clearing Member shall remain responsible for any balances pending settlement and for the delinquent balances, if any, corresponding to the clearing orders accepted by the CCLV prior to the time of suspension. Moreover, the suspended Clearing Member / Indirect Clearing Member shall be bound to fulfill the other obligations set forth by these Rules.

The Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members shall be responsible for contributing the required guarantees resulting from their principals' clearing orders, and the Clearing Members will be, in turn, responsible for contributing the guarantees required from the orders of their Indirect Clearing Members that were entered through it, when the latter do not meet said requirements according to the provisions set forth herein.

The types of instruments or securities authorized to pay guarantees and their valuation methodology shall be governed by the provisions set forth in Section E of these Rules.

2.6.3.2 Minimum Guarantee

This guarantee shall correspond to the minimum guarantee level delivered on their own account and that the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members shall permanently keep with the CCLV, the amount of which is calculated on the basis of the contracts opened on their own account and on non-allocated contracts.

The calculation of this guarantee amount shall be at least equal to the average amount of the current guarantee required on their own account and the amount of the current guarantee required by the open contracts not allocated in any of the intra-day calculation of guarantees during the last 90 calendar days , including in that average only the trading days .

Minimum guarantees shall be required from a recently accepted Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent, for trading start-up purposes, calculated on the basis of the average minimum guarantees of the other participants.

The amount of minimum guarantees to be delivered by a New Clearing Agent / Indirect Agent until the expiration of the first three months will be, the greater of, the the amount mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the minimum guarantees calculated on the basis of the average current guarantees accrued required on their own account and the current guarantee required for the open contracts not allocated.

2.6.3.3 Current Guarantee

The current guarantee is the one intended to cover at least the losses resulting from the replacement risk that could materialize in the event of any potential default of the obligations of the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent under normal market volatility conditions.

Open contracts arising from the clearing orders of derivatives are taken into account to calculate the current guarantee, to be settled on the trading day immediately following the calculation of the financial balances thereof..

The calculation of the current guarantee for the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members is made on the basis of:

- The calculation of risk of open net contracts on the own account of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent.
- The calculation of risk of open net contracts of each principal.
- The calculation of risk of open contracts not allocated.

The calculation of current guarantees arising from open net contracts on their own account and on the account of their principals is made on the basis of derivatives portfolio. In addition, the calculation of guarantees from non allocated open contracts is made considering the clearing orders either individually or on a gross basis, excluding the portfolio effect.

The methodology used by CCLV to define the calculation of the current guarantee, the types of instruments authorized to pay it and its form of valuation described in Section E of these Rules, shall be at any time subject to the regulations provided for by the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor.

The methodology to calculate the value of the current guarantee applied on a daily and intra-day basis intends to:

- Measure the risk associated with the net balances to settle on a daily basis, arising from the open net contracts of each Clearing Agent/ Indirect Clearing Agent on their own account and on their principals', account, and the non-allocated open contracts. .
- Measure the risk arising from the open contracts in full force and effect at the time the calculation is made.

The measurement of the risk arising from the net balances to be daily settled, generated by the valuation of open contracts, is applied on the basis of checking any potential losses and profits according to the market movements observed during the day, under the valuation methodology mentioned in paragraphs 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2 of Section C of these Rules.

The measurement of the risk arising from the open contracts in effect is based on the application of the Value at Risk (VaR) method which allows assessing the potential loss of net open contracts of each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and their principals, considering the risk of potential losses and profits according to the market movements observed at least in the last rolling year. The VaR method described in annex D.1 hereof, is applied under regular market conditions at a given period of time, with a certain confidence level and based on market price movements. The potential loss will be calculated for a time frame at least subject to the terms set forth in the extraordinary processes of settlement described in these Rules.

The confidence level to be used for the calculation is at least 99%.

The calculation of the current guarantee shall be made every 60 minutes at least, including the clearing orders of derivatives entering the CCLV's systems by the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members and their net balances to be settled and delinquent

balances in order to permanently measure and monitor the possible requirements of margin calls to the CCLV's Clearing Members and Indirect Clearing Members.

Furthermore, the calculation mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be made more frequently during periods of greater volatility and abnormal volumes. Greater volatility means that range of fluctuations of risk factor prices with a probability of occurrence below 1% during a trading day, and such calculation shall be based on at least the last 250 business days.

The number of business days to be used in the methodology to calculate the current guarantees under normal market conditions and to determine periods of greater volatility and abnormal volumes shall be reported through Internal Communications at least ten business days in advance to their effective date, subject to the prior Board of Directors' approval.

CCLV may exclude from the calculation of current guarantees, any specific events or transactions of significant amounts which may alter the regular calculation of such guarantees and shall give notice thereof to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor on the day of occurrence.

The calculation method of the current guarantees shall be assessed on a quarterly basis based on the sufficiency of the guarantees as regards hypothetical past defaults through retrospective tests, the results of which – along with the composition of guarantees delivered – will be made available to the market through the CCLV's web site.

2.6.3.4 Additional Guarantee

If, according to the financial information analysis of the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent, the CCLV determines a higher exposure to risk than the one arising from its level of transactions in relation to their capital, the CCLV shall be empowered to require additional guarantees.

The CCLV may determine additional guarantees based on the relation between the capital level, its level of transactions, the operation capacity of the Clearing Agent/ Indirect Clearing Agent and other criteria considered relevant at that time. This requirement shall remain in full force and effect until CCLV considers that those variables and criteria have been successfully exceeded.

In addition to the foregoing, the CCLV may require additional guarantees to cover events where the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members and principals, as applicable, exceed the concentration limits defined by the CCLV. To such effect, any additional guarantees required for having exceeded the concentrated limit will be calculated considering at least the following:

- An additional guarantee for having exceeded the concentration limit of a Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent: As defined in paragraph 2.6.4.1, if a Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent exceeds the concentration limit defined by the CCLV for one or more series of derivatives, an additional guarantee will be automatically required from the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent for having exceeded such limit, which shall be covered under the terms mentioned in these Rules. The method to calculate the additional guarantee in this case will be notified through Internal Comm at least 10 business days prior to its effective date, subject to the prior approval of the Supervisor.
- An additional guarantee for having exceeded the concentration limit of clearing orders submitted on the principal's account : according to the definition set forth in paragraph 2.6.4.1, if the concentration limit defined by the CCLV is exceeded with regard to certain principal and for one or more series of derivatives kept through all the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members, with whom the principal maintains a relationship in such capacity, additional guarantee will be automatically required for having exceeded such limit, which shall be charged against the principal in proportion to the net open contracts kept by the latter with each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent with which it maintains a contractual relationship in full force and effect for the execution of derivatives contracts, which shall be covered under the terms mentioned in these Rules. The method to calculate the additional guarantee will be reported through Internal Comm at least 10 business days prior to its effective date and subject to the approval of the Supervisor.

2.6.4 Limits

2.6.4.1 Concentration Limit

The CCLV shall establish concentration limits for derivatives arising from stock exchanges, and aimed at controlling the net open contracts by each derivative and its series, by Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and by each principal, which will be reported on line through its information systems to the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members.

For each series, the limits will be defined as the greater of a percentage of all open contracts and a fixed number of contracts. Both parameters will be defined by the CCLV and reported to the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members on the CCLV/Derivatives web site.

The method to calculate those concentration limits will be notified through Internal Comm at least 10 business days in advance to its effective date and subject to the approval of the Supervisor.

2.6.4.1.1 Concentration Limit by Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent

Each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent will have a concentration limit defined by the CCLV based on the open net contracts kept on a given series, considering the open contracts allocated to their own account, the contracts opened of their principals and those open contracts which have not been allocated during the trading day, which are the responsibility of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent..

The CCLV may modify the parameters to establish the limits of the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members, provided it deems so appropriate, based on the level of transactions and their risk with respect to the capital level thereof, the operation of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent, the underlying asset of the involved instruments and any other criteria considered relevant at that time.

In the event a Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent exceeds the prescribed limits, the CCLV will require additional guarantees for having exceeded such limit and may require the closing of open contracts for the specific series for which such limit has been exceeded.

2.6.4.1.2 Concentration Limit by Principal

Each principal will have a concentration limit by series defined by the CCLV based on the open contracts it holds for each series, based on the open contracts it maintains through all Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent for which it operates, and on the open contracts of its related persons.

The CCLV may modify the parameters to establish the concentration limits by principal, provided it deems so appropriate, based on the level of transactions and their risk, the underlying asset of the involved instruments and any other criteria considered relevant at that time.

In the event a principal exceeds the prescribed limits, the CCLV will require additional guarantees for having exceed such limit from the involved Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members in proportion to the open contracts in excess the principal holds with each Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members and it may require the closing of the open contracts in proportion to the exceeded open contracts for the specific series for which such limit was exceeded.

2.6.4.2 Intra-Day Risk Limit

The CCLV will set an intra-day risk limit for those clearing orders of derivatives arising from stock exchanges and from over-the counter transactions, entered and registered during the trading day. This limit will be applied to each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent participating in the clearing and settlement of derivatives and it is intended to limit the risk

of clearing orders for which enough guarantees have not been entered in the CCLV's system.

The intra-day risk limit will be, the lower of, 40% of guarantees entered on their own account, and 30,000 Unidades de Fomento.

The CCLV's information system will provide each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent during the time schedule of the trading day, with updated information regarding its level of use of the intra-day risk limit.

The impact of each clearing order entered and registered in the CCLV system on the use of the intra-daily risk limit of each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent will be verified. When the difference between the required guarantees and the entered guarantees of a Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent is greater than its intra-day risk limit, the CCLV will immediately request the stock exchanges to suspend the transactions in the trading systems of derivatives leading to an increase in the exposure of the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent with the CCLV or to suspend any admission of transactions in the trading systems, when the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members act as broker or direct operator. In addition, the admission of new clearing orders of derivatives for over-the-counter transactions authorized by the Supervisor will not be allowed.

These measures mentioned above shall remain in full force and effect until the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent regulates the reasons that caused the application thereof, by delivering a greater number of guarantees within the terms required by the CCLV in order to restore the use level of the intra-day risk limit within the levels accepted by the CCLV.

Without prejudice to the foregoing, the CCLV may take the measures mentioned above at any time of the day, for amounts lower than those previously mentioned. Whenever it deems them appropriate.

2.6.4.3 Price Fluctuation Limit

2.6.4.3.1 Price Fluctuation Limit for Clearing Orders of Derivatives from Stock Exchanges

The CCLV will set limits on the fluctuation of prices for clearing orders of derivatives arising from stock exchanges in order to avoid the admission and registration of orders with an excessive increase in price volatility, without such volatility being incorporated in the relevant calculation of guarantees.

Price fluctuation limits shall be defined by series and applied on a daily or intra-day comparative basis according to the following:

- i) If the limit is applied on a daily comparative basis, it will correspond to the maximum variation permitted for the admission price of a bid or tender on a particular series in the trading systems of the stock exchanges with respect to the daily settlement price of the previous trading day. This maximum variation will be defined for each underlying asset based on the characteristics of each futures contract listed on stock exchanges.

In addition to the foregoing, the CCLV may request the stock exchanges during the trading day, to suspend in the trading systems, a specific series or series associated with an underlying asset in the case of high volatility periods. Such high volatility refers to that price fluctuation range with a probability of occurrence lower than 1% during a trading day, such calculation being based at least on the last 250 trading days. The CCLV will analyze each case during the trading day and may request the corresponding stock exchanges to resume the trading of the suspended series or reaffirm the suspension thereof.

- ii) If the limit is applied on an intra-day comparative basis, it will correspond to the maximum variation permitted for the admission price of a bid or tender on a particular series in the trading systems of the stock exchanges with respect to the last trading price thereof. This maximum variation will be defined for each underlying asset based on the characteristics of each futures contract listed on stock exchanges.

The modification or elimination of price fluctuation limits may occur at any time as CCLV deems it appropriate, even during the trading hours by giving prior notice thereof to the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members at least 30 minutes in advance to its effective term.

The price fluctuation limits and its levels will be permanently informed on the CCLV/Derivatives web site and will be reviewed at least on a quarterly basis.

2.6.4.3.2 Price Fluctuation Limit for Clearing Orders of Derivatives from Over-The-Counter Transactions

The CCLV will set limits on the fluctuation of prices for clearing orders of derivatives arising from over-the-counter transactions authorized by the Supervisor in order to avoid the registration and admission of orders with an excessive increase in price volatility, without such volatility being incorporated in the relevant calculation of guarantees.

Price fluctuation limits shall be defined by series and applied on a daily comparative basis, i.e., comparing the trading price reported in a clearing order to a reference price. This reference price may be defined as the daily settlement price of the previous trading day of the series or other series with the same or similar maturity date and underlying asset, both for derivatives arising from in stock market transactions and over-the-counter transactions,

or another price the CCLV may determine according to the methods to calculate daily settlement price defined in paragraph 2.3.1.2 of these Rules.

Should the agreed price of a clearing order arising from an over-the-counter transaction fail to meet the price fluctuation limit, such order shall be rejected in the corresponding acceptance process as indicated in paragraph 2.4.2 of this Section.

The modification or elimination of price fluctuation limits may occur at any time as CCLV deems it convenient by giving prior notice thereof to the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members at least 30 minutes in advance to its effective term.

The price fluctuation limits, its levels and parameters associated with the calculation will be permanently informed on the web site CCLV/Derivatives and will be reviewed at least on a quarterly basis.

2.6.4.4 Limit on Open Contracts

The CCLV will set limits on the number of open contracts for derivatives arising from stock exchanges, in order to control the net open contracts of each series at market level and at the individual level, grouped by underlying assets.

To such effect, the maximum limit of total open contracts that may exist in the market and the maximum limit of net open contracts that each Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent and their principals may keep shall be established for each underlying asset and derivative instrument, including the related persons in the calculation of the latter, .

Should the established limits be exceeded, the CCLV may request the involved parties to close the open contracts in excess and such measure shall be applied until the open contracts fall within the limits established by the CCLV.

Only for the purposes of determining the limit of open contracts, the CCLV may exclude certain transactions from the calculation of open net contracts, if the Clearing Members/Indirect Clearing Members prove that the single purpose of the transactions mentioned above is to cover the price fluctuation risks on the underlying asset market.

The limits on open contracts will be informed permanently through the CCLV's information systems, which will be reviewed at least quarterly.

2.6.5 Guarantee Fund of Derivatives

A guarantee fund will be established with the contributions of Clearing Members for the clearing and settlement of derivatives being settled the next trading day immediately after the calculation of their financial balances.

Only the Clearing Members are bound to contribute cash or financial instruments as collateral to secure the establishment of the guarantee funds. In this calculation, both the net contracts opened on their own account and on the account of their principals the closing of the trading day will be incorporated, as well as those of their Indirect Clearing Members and the guarantees required from each of them in proportion to the accepted clearing orders which are to be entered through its Clearing Members.

The guarantee fund of derivatives shall be at least equal to the sum of the two greatest potential losses not covered by the required individual current guarantees, based on extreme market condition reasonably likely to occur, and at least on the last 250 tracings days. .

The CCLV will update and inform the amount of the guarantee fund for derivatives on a monthly basis, as well as the contributions that each Clearing Agent must make. Thus, a requirement of guarantees or a report on the surplus thereof may be generated, which will be disclosed to each Clearing Agent through the information systems.

The amount the Clearing Members shall contribute will be informed on the first business day of the month and it shall be paid no later than at a specific time on the next business day to be established by an Internal Comm.

As an internal management measure, the result of scenario tests that determine the fund value required will be daily calculated, provided that upon the occurrence of any high volatility event on the market or the existence of abnormal volumes of clearing orders, , the CCLV may immediately request any contributions necessary to increase the guarantee fund.

High volatility shall refer to that price fluctuation range of the risk factors with a probability of occurrence lower than 1% during a trading day. Also, abnormal volumes shall refer to the amount associated with open contracts with a probability of occurrence lower than 1% during a trading day. Such calculation shall be based on at least the last 250 trading days, which shall be reported through Internal Communications no later than 10 business days in advance to the effective term thereof, subject to the Board of Directors' approval.

Moreover, upon the occurrence of high volatility events on the market or abnormal volumes of clearing orders, CCLV –subject to the prior favorable proposal from the Risk Committee- may exclude from the fund calculation, those results of the stress tests on those events, as long as those results exceed by far the scenario with a reasonable probability of occurrence, all of which shall be recorded in the relevant minutes of the meeting of the respective Risk Committee. . In any case, the approval of the exclusion situations listed above shall also be previously approved by the Supervisor. However, it shall be understood that the exclusion situations related to high volatility events on the market or abnormal volumes of clearing orders contemplated in the preceding paragraph, have been previously approved by the Supervisor.

The amounts to be entered will be reported to each Clearing Agent during the day the calculation was made, and they shall be entered no later than the next business day at the scheduled time established above.

The types of instruments authorized to enter guarantees in the guarantee fund of derivatives and their valuation form will be ruled according to the provisions set forth in Section E of these Rules.

The CCLV may modify the crisis periods considered in the calculation of the fund, due to events in which market conditions are highly volatile or behave in an abnormal way, all of which shall be reported by Internal Communications.

The method to calculate the guarantee fund of derivatives to be entered as described in detail in Annex D.3 hereof, shall be subject to the rules provided for by the Supervisor to these effects. In order to obtain the amount of the contribution of each Clearing Agent, the following processes will take place:

- i) Based on a horizon of at least the last 250 business days, Clearing Members the value of the worst possible loss of its net balances and net open contracts resulting at the end of the trading day for the clearing and settlement of derivatives is calculated for each Clearing Agent and its Indirect Clearing Agent, using the scenarios established in the Internal Communication
- ii) For each Clearing Agent, the value of the required guarantees is deducted from the worst loss calculated in the preceding paragraph i), , including those required from the Clearing Members and their Indirect Clearing Members as defined in paragraph 2.6.3.1 of this Section.
- iii) Then, the total value of the guarantee fund of derivatives to be entered shall be equivalent at least to the sum of the two greatest amounts calculated in ii).
- iv) The contribution of each Clearing Agent to the guarantee fund of derivatives shall be the proportional value between the result obtained in ii) and the sum of the values obtained in ii) for all Clearing Members.

In the case of a recently accepted Clearing Agent, a contribution to the guarantee fund of derivatives shall be required to start trading calculated on the basis of the average contributions of the other participants.

Until the third month of operation of the new Clearing Agent, the amount to be entered to the fund shall be to the greater amount between the amount mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the calculation of its contribution based on the average accrued to the date of the amount calculated in i).

When the CCLV reports a surplus in the guarantee fund of derivatives, it will inform the Clearing Members, who may withdraw their contributions from that time, provided there is no deficit in the required guarantees.

With regard to the use of the guarantee fund of derivatives in extraordinary settlement processes according to the provisions set forth in these Rules, the CCLV will use the guarantee fund as follows:

- i. First, the guarantees contributed to the guarantee fund of derivatives by the defaulting Clearing Agent will be used.
- ii. From the remaining balance, the contribution made by each Clearing Agent to the use of the fund will be calculated in proportion according to the amount demanded to the fund.

When the defaulting party is an Indirect Clearing Agent, first the contribution of the Clearing Agent or Agents through which the clearing orders entered will be used in proportion to the orders entered through each one of them and then the one mentioned in i) and ii) above will be followed.

The guarantee fund of derivatives will be used once per event. If there is more than one event at the same time, the fund will be used in proportion to the amount of defaults according to the provisions set forth in the preceding paragraph.

The CCLV, through its information systems, will inform each Clearing Agent immediately of the amount that was deducted from its contribution a result of the calculation mentioned above.

Once they are informed of the abatement of their contributions, the Clearing Members will be required to return to the guarantee fund, those resources that were reduced no later than on the next business day at the time established above.

The foregoing is without prejudice to any judicial and/or extrajudicial actions that the CCLV may bring against the defaulting Clearing Agent and/or Indirect Clearing Agent

As to the foreclosure of the fund guarantees to be settled that, funds in cash shall be used first and then guarantees shall be foreclosed, from the most liquid to the least liquid instruments on the stock markets, where appropriate, whether by the sale of such instruments or by repos. Liquid instruments refer to those instruments issued by the Central Bank and the General Treasury of the Republic. The proceeds thereof will be used to pay the amount corresponding to the extraordinary settlement, penalties and fines according to what is stated in paragraph 2 of this Section.

The CCLV will not invest the guarantees entered by the Clearing Members for the guarantee funds, keeping them in the accounts available for such purpose in the DCV or at the bank where current accounts for the cash are held.

If within the time periods established by the CCLV to enter the contribution to the guarantee fund of derivatives, the Clearing Agent fails to comply with such obligation, the CCLV will immediately request the stock exchanges to suspend them in the trading systems when they acts as brokers or direct operator, and the Clearing Agent will be operationally suspended, not allowing the admission of clearing orders and informing the Discipline Committee the same day the fact occurs. The operational suspension will remain in full force and effect until the Clearing Agent regulates the reasons that caused that suspension.

Such process will be implemented by giving direct notice on the day of the default addressed to the General Manager or to the person acting as such, of the corresponding stock exchange through which the Clearing Agent operates, detailing the reason of the request and a copy of such request will be sent that same day to the General manager of the defaulting party.

The suspended Clearing Agent will continue to be responsible for the settlement of any outstanding balances and delinquent balances, if any, corresponding to the clearing orders

accepted by the CCLV at the time of the suspension. Also, suspended the Clearing Agent will continue to be responsible for any other obligations set forth in these Rules.

2.6.6 Reserve Fund

According to the definition in number 3 of this Section.

3. RESERVE FUND OF THE CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY SYSTEM

The CCLV is bound to establish reserve funds for each system managed by it in order to fulfill the obligations assumed by it toward the Clearing Members / Indirect Clearing Members. .

In the case of the Central Counterparty, those resources entering this fund shall be used for extraordinary settlement procedures according to the provisions set forth in paragraph 1 and 2 of this section.

The method to calculate the minimum amount of the reserve fund, which incorporates the regulations provided for by the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor for these purposes, shall correspond to the sum of the amounts resulting from the following calculations:

- 2 per thousand of the average from the 2 greatest net daily debit balances recorded by the Clearing Members for clearing orders accepted in the clearing and settlement of variable income within the period of two rolling years as from the calculation date backwards.
- 4 per thousand of the average from the 2 greatest net daily debit balances recorded by the Clearing Members for clearing orders accepted in the clearing and settlement of derivatives income within the period of two rolling years as from the calculation date backwards.

4. REGISTER OF CCLV-DERIVATIVES TRANSACTIONS

The CCLV shall keep a record of the transactions with derivatives settled and cleared through the Central Counterparty System.

Such Register will be updated daily with a lag period of not more than one business day and it shall contain all individualized transactions made, including at least the following information fields:

A. Information on the Clearing Agent/Indirect Clearing Agent:

1. TIN (RUT)/Identification number
2. Name or firm name

B. Information on the principals:

1. TIN (RUT)/Identification number
2. Name or firm name
3. Economic sector
4. Country

C. Information on the operation:

1. Page
2. Undersigning date
3. Expiry date
4. Number of days in effect
5. Type of derivative
6. Underlying asset(s)
7. Amount
8. Future price/forward price
9. Interest Rates , when applicable
10. Spot price
11. Early expiry

The Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor will have direct access to this Register through the CCLV's system.

Also, an attached version of this Register is available on a daily basis on the CCLV/Derivatives web site, including at least information on the total open contracts of the market by series, underlying assets, and types of counterparty.

The CCLV and the Supervisor may agree on modifications to the fields consulted through this Register, without any modification of these Rules being necessary.

The Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor may require compliance with technological and information standards in the structuring and development of this Register. To this effect, it will follow the best international practices on this matter.



ANNEXES

ANNEX D.1: Methodology to calculate the current guarantees and valuation of guarantees entering the Central Counterparty System

This annex explains the methodology used to calculate the following:

- a) The current guarantees demanded for the clearing and settlement of variable income according to the net selling and purchasing positions of each Clearing Agent and/or Indirect Clearing Agent.
- b) The current guarantees demanded for the clearing and settlement of derivatives according to the open net contracts on their own account, on the account of principals, and not allocated to each Clearing Agent and/or Indirect Clearing Agent.
- c) The determination of haircuts or discounts to be applied to the entered guarantees by them, explaining the terminology used and the assumptions behind the model.

The risk factors to which the orders accepted at CCLV are exposed are for example, the interest rates, exchange rates and stock market indexes, namely, curves of risk-free interest rates in pesos and in UF; curves of interbank rates of interest for banks rated as N1 and N2 in pesos and UF; exchange rates for US dollars and Euros, foreign interest rates if there are deposits of foreign bonds as guarantee, as well as the value of UF and IPSA.

- a. By dividing the amount of the third worst observation of the distribution by the market value of this instrument, the worst possible loss is obtained in percentage for the level of confidence chosen. From this value, the current value of guarantees under non-allocated open contracts not is obtained, such calculation is made considering the expected value of the clearing orders individually or on a gross basis, excluding the effect at portfolio level. This procedure is also used as discount from the instruments paid by the Clearing Agent / Indirect Clearing Agent as guarantees (haircut).
- b. Risk factors from derivatives contracts will be differentiated according to each type of contract, underlying asset, term and currency. Such factors will be, for example, exchange rates, *unidad de fomento*, stock exchange indexes, price of shares, rates of interest, curves of rates of interest free of risks, curves of interbank rates denominated in pesos and *unidades de fomento* as in US dollarsthat are necessary to value each underlying asset. In addition, all underlying assets will be necessary, such as currency, fixed-income instruments, rates of interest and adjustment units authorized under the provisions of Chapter III.D.1 of the Compendium of Financial Rules of the Central Bank of Chile.
- c. The application of the Value at Risk (VaR) method is applied under normal market conditions and high volatility market conditions , considering the movements of market prices over a time horizon for the potential loss, which may be different for

clearing orders of derivatives from stock exchanges and clearing orders arising from over-the-counter transactions authorized by the Supervisor.

ANNEX 3: Calculation of the Guarantee Fund of Derivatives

The method used to determine the guarantee fund of derivatives consists in valuing the open net contracts and the current guarantees in the system of risks, applying the variations of risk factors of each instrument and obtaining the portfolio value for each date contemplated in crisis scenarios.

Once the portfolio has been revalued as many times as scenarios are considered, a profile of losses and profits is obtained for each of the mentioned dates , which allows building the empirical distribution of the portfolio in the event of changes in the financial variables that may affect it.